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TBE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF ADOLESCENCE
Elizabeth S. Scott*

I.

INTRODUCTION

American lawmakers have had relatively clear images of childhood
and adulthood-images that fit with our conventional notions. Children
are innocent beings, who are dependent, vulnerable, and incapable of
making competent decisions. Several aspects of the legal regulation of
childhood are based on this account. Children are assumed not to be
accountable for their choices or for their behavior, an assumption that is
reflected in legal policy toward their criminal conduct. They are also
assumed to be unable to exercise the rights and privileges that adults
enjoy, and thus are not permitted to vote, drive, or make their own
medical decisions. Finally, children are assumed to need care, support,
and education in order to develop into healthy productive adults. The
obligation to provide the services critical to children's welfare rests first
with parents and ultimately with the state. When children cross the line
to legal adulthood, they are assumed to be autonomous persons who are
responsible for their conduct, entitled as citizens to legal rights and
privileges, and no longer entitled to support or special protections.
This picture is deceptively simple, of course. In fact, the legal
regulation of children is extremely complex. Much of the complexity
can be traced ultimately to a single source-defining the boundary
between childhood and adulthood. Thus, the question, "What is a child?"
is readily answered by policy makers, but the answer to the question,
"When does childhood end?" is different in different policy contexts.
This variation makes it very difficult to discern a coherent image of legal
University Professor and Robert C. Taylor Research Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law. For helpful comments, thanks to Robert Scott, Bill Stuntz, David Tan:nhaus, and
Frank Zimring, and to participants in a colloquium sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation
Research Network in Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. This Essay was first dclivered
as a lecture at the 2000 Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture at Hofstra
University School of Law on October 25, 2000.
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childhood. Youths who are in elementary school may be deemed adults
for purposes of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment, while
seniors in high school cannot vote and most college students are legally
prohibited from drinking.'
The picture is complicated further by the fact that policy makers
have no clear image of adolescence. Generally, they ignore this
transitional developmental stage, classifying adolescents legally either as
children or as adults, depending on the issue at hand. For many
purposes, adolescents are described in legal rhetoric as though they were
indistinguishable from young children, and are subject to paternalistic
policies based on assumptions of dependence, vulnerability, and
incompetence.2 For other purposes, teenagers are treated as fully mature
adults, who are competent to make decisions, accountable for their
choices and entitled to no special accommodations.3
For the most part, this binary classification scheme works well. A
bright line rule that designates a particular age as the boundary between
childhood and adulthood for multiple purposes (the "age of majority"),
regardless of actual maturity, has the advantage of providing a clear
signal of the attainment of adult legal status. It is also administratively
efficient and promotes parental responsibility. Moreover, by shifting the
boundary and extending adult rights and duties at different ages for
different purposes, lawmakers accomplish the transition from childhood
to adulthood gradually, without creating an intermediate category for
adolescence. Adolescents may benefit if they are allowed to make some
adult decisions or perform some adult functions, but not others. Thus,
for example, the gap between the minimum legal threshold for driving
and drinking offers young persons independence and mobility, while
protecting them (and us) from the costs of immature youthful judgment.
Indeed, the experience with the burdensome administrative and social
1. In twenty-seven states, a ten-year-old charged with murder could be tried as an adult. See
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:

A NATIONAL REPORT 86-87 (1995). For a discussion of legislative reform lowering the age at which
minors can be tried as adults, see infra text accompanying notes 145-50. The voting age and the
passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment are discussed infra notes 61-68. See 23 U.S.C. § 158
(Supp. IV 1999) (beginning September 30, 1985, federal funds for highway construction will be
withheld from any state that has a drinking age of less than twenty-one years of age).
2. Good examples of this rhetoric include judicial language justifying restrictions on
adolescent abortion. See infra text accompanying notes 40-41 (discussing the language used by the
Court in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)); see also infra text accompanying notes 120-39
(noting the political arguments by Progressive reformers advocating for the establishment of a
juvenile court).
3. See, e.g., infra note 80 (providing some circumstances in which teenagers are treated as
adults).
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costs of an intermediate category in the context of abortion regulation
reinforces the conclusion that the transition to adulthood generally is
regulated more efficiently through binary legislative categories-even if
the crude
classification of adolescents sometimes distorts developmental
4
reality.
In some contexts, however, categorical assumptions that ignore the
transitional stage of adolescence can lead to harmful outcomes. In
particular, juvenile justice policy offers ample evidence of the costs of
using crude categories to define legal childhood and adulthood! In this
setting, the boundary of childhood has shifted dramatically over the
course of the twentieth century. Since the establishment of the juvenile
court in 1899, young offenders have been transformed in legal rhetoric
from innocent children to hardened adult criminals.6 On my view,
however, both the romanticized vision of youth offered by the early
Progressive reformers and the harsh account of modem conservatives
are distortions-and both have been the basis of unsatisfactory policies.
The architects of the traditional juvenile court pretended that youth
welfare was the only goal of juvenile justice policy. This fiction ignored
the government's interest in punishment and public protection, and
ultimately, it did not serve the interests of young offenders or that of
society. Modem reformers focus only on punishment and public
protection, and ignore any differences between juvenile offenders and
adults.' A policy that ignores youth welfare is not only anomalous, but is
unlikely to achieve the utilitarian goal of reducing the social costs of
youth crime. In this context, effective legal regulation requires the
(conventional) accommodation of youth welfare and social utility goals,
and also (and this is less typical) a realistic account of adolescence.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I presents the legal account of
childhood, sketching the traits that are assumed to distinguish children
from adults and the policies that are based on these assumptions.
Contrasting with the straightforward account of childhood is the absence
of any clear vision of adolescence. Part II turns to the issue of how the
state draws the legal boundary between childhood and adulthood. The
analysis of the presumptive age of majority includes an examination of
4. The judicial by-pass hearing (to provide a forum for a pregnant teenager to demonstrate
that she should be allowed to make the abortion decision without involving her parents) is a key
element of abortion regulation. For a discussion of the legal and constitutional framework that has

resulted from efforts to accommodate competing interests, see infra text accompan)ing notes 10215.
5. See discussion infra Part I1B.
6. See discussion hifra Part M11
7. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which offers interesting
lessons on how we fix this boundary. Part II then examines medical
decision-making and abortion rights, contexts that clarify the benefits of
a binary classification scheme. Abortion regulation particularly is
instructive of the costs of an intermediate category that uses a case-bycase approach. Part fII examines juvenile justice policy, a context in
which the general efficiency of binary classification does not hold.
Strikingly different (and largely fictional) accounts of young offenders
have been deployed in service of the policy agendas of Progressives and
of modem conservatives. I conclude that a justice policy that treats
adolescence as a distinct legal category not only will promote youth
welfare, but will also advance utilitarian objectives of reducing the costs
of youth crime.
II.

LEGAL IMAGES OF CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

A. Assumptions About Childhood in Legal Policy
Paternalistic legal regulation of children is based on a conventional
understanding of childhood, an understanding that conforms quite well
to the developmental account of human capacities in the early stages of
life. Immature youths are assumed to be unable to look out for
themselves, and thus are in need of adult supervision and guidance.
Several interrelated dimensions of immaturity are important in shaping
legal policies that treat children differently from adults. First, children
are dependent on others-initially, for survival and, as they grow, for the
care that will enable them to mature to adulthood. This dependency
means that others provide for their basic needs-for food, shelter, health
care, affection, and education-so that they may become healthy,
productive members of society. Children also lack the capacity to make
sound decisions. Because of their immature cognitive development,
children are unable to employ reasoning and understanding sufficiently
to make choices on the basis of a rational decision-making process!
Children's decision-making also reflects immature judgment, which may
lead them to make choices that are harmful to their interests and the
interests of others.9 This decision-making immaturity warrants giving
others authority over important decisions affecting children's lives.
8. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE
36 (1982); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking,37 VILL. L.
REV. 1607 (1992).
9. See generally Scott, supranote 8.
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Finally, children are assumed to be malleable and thus vulnerable to
both influence and harm from others.'
This account of childhood leads quite naturally to the conclusion
that children must be subject to adult authority, and that the deeply
ingrained political values of autonomy, responsibility, and liberty simply
do not apply to them." Under American law, primary responsibility for
the welfare of children and authority over their lives is given to their
parents. Justice Burger captured the conventional rationale for this
assignment in Parhanv.J.R.,'2 a United States Supreme Court opinion
dealing with parent's authority to admit their children to state psychiatric
hospitals. 3
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."
Parents are charged with their children's basic care and with the duty to
protect them from harm. They also are authorized to make decisions on
their behalf about matters ranging from nutrition, medical treatment, and
residence to (in theory) the choice of friends and reading material.
Parental responsibility and authority go hand in hand. In some sense it is
fair to view parental "rights" as legal compensation for the burden of
responsibility that the law imposes on parents.'s
Of course, parents do not have total authority over their children's
lives. Society has an important stake in the healthy development of
children, and it will bear the burden of parental failure to fulfill their
obligations. Moreover, under its historic parens patriae authority, the
government has the responsibility to look out for the welfare of minors
10. The presumed malleability of children supported the argument that young offenders
would respond positively to rehabilitation, a claim that was central to the rehabilitative model of
juvenile justice. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND IE TRANsFoRA
,%T1ON OF THE
JuvENiLE COURT 92 (1999).
11. Even John Stuart Mill assumed that liberal principles do not apply to children: -it is.
perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine [libertyl is meant to apply only to human beings
in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children or of young persons below the age
which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood." JoH, STUART MILL, O. LimrEnTy 9
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1978) (1859).
12. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
13. See generally id.
14. Id. at 602.
15. Robert Scott and I have developed this argument celhere. See generally Elizanbeh S.
Scott &Robert E. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA. L REV. 2401 (1995).
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and other helpless members of society. 6 Thus, parental authority is
subject to government supervision; if parents fall to provide adequate
care, the state will intervene to protect children's welfare. The state also

preempts parental authority more categorically on some issues. For
example, under child labor and school attendance laws, parents cannot7
decide that their children should work instead of attending school.'
Traditionally, policy debates in this area have focused on the allocation
of authority between parents and the state. 8
It may be useful to sketch more precisely how assumptions about
children's dependency, incompetence, and vulnerability are expressed in
legal regulation. First, children's rights and privileges are far more
restricted than are those accorded adults. 9 Because they are assumed to

lack the capacity for reasoning, understanding, and mature judgment,
children cannot vote, make most medical decisions, drink alcohol, or
drive motor vehicles. Their First Amendment right of free speech is
more limited than is that of adults, in part because it is assumed that they
may be vulnerable to harmful effects. Thus, for example, the Supreme

Court has held that the state can restrict children's access to obscene
material that would be protected speech for adults, and that public school

officials can censor material in school newspapers."0 Through curfew
16. The government's parens patriae authority arose out of the king's duty to provide for
persons under legal disability, such as infants and the insane. See BLACK'S LAW DItTIONARY 1137
(7th ed. 1999). Originally developed by chancery courts as an equitable concept applied to property
rights, the parenspatriaedoctrine formally entered American jurisprudence to justify commitment
of juveniles to refuges in the leading case of Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). See generally
Douglas R. Rendleman, ParensPatriae:From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REv. 205
(1971).
17. The Supreme Court enunciated this constraint on parental rights in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), by upholding the Massachusetts child labor law, against a
challenge that it infringed on parental authority. See id. at 170.
18. This line drawing has been the subject of much constitutional litigation. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that Amish parents cannot be penalized for
not complying with a compulsory school attendance statute); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (holding
that the state may limit parental freedom and authority when necessary to protect the welfare of
children); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have the
right to send their children to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) ("[Tlhe
legislature has attempted materially to interfere with ...the power of parents to control the
education of their own."). A contemporary debate focuses on parental objections to public school
curriculum. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987)
(finding the required use of a textbook series no unconstitutional burden under the Free Exercise
Clause), cert. denied,484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
19. See Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to TheirAutonolny: The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 449, 453 (1996).
20. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (upholding a New York
statute restricting the sale of "obscene material" to minors); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988) (upholding the prior restraint of a school newspaper).
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ordinances, the government can limit the freedom of minors to move
about in society through restrictions that clearly would be
unconstitutional for adults.' The premise of these laws is that children
roaming the streets at night may get in trouble (through the exercise of
immature judgment), and that they will be vulnerable to harmful
influences.
Second, children are not held to an adult standard of legal
accountability for their choices and behavior, because of assumptions
about their cognitive and social immaturity, and their vulnerability to
undue influence. Thus, under the infancy doctrine in contract law,
minors are free to disaffirm most contracts.' Many of the cases involve
motor vehicles, which courts seem to believe that youths might be
tempted to purchase without considering the obligation that they are
undertaking.2 As one court put it, a minor "should be protected from his
own bad judgments as well as from adults who would take advantage of
24

hiM"

In the same category, but of broader importance, is the traditional
legal response to criminal conduct by juveniles. The founders of the
Juvenile Court at the turn of the last century advocated against assigning
criminal responsibility to the offenses of children.? Children were not
criminally responsible, on their view, because they lacked the capacity
for reasoning, moral understanding, and judgment on which attributions
of blameworthiness must rest."S The integrity of the criminal law would
be undermined if incompetent children were subject to criminal
21. Courts recognize that curfew ordinances would violate the rights of adults to move about
in public, but uphold carefully tailored ordinances that are directed at juveniles. See Schleifer v.
City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 852 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding as constitutional a nocturnal
juvenile curfew ordinance); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,496 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).

22. MInors are liable only on contracts for necessaries. Under the traditional rle, minors can
disaffirm other contracts, at their option, returning consideration in possession, but wvith no liability
for use or damage. Under the modem (minority) rule, minors can disaffirm, but must compen-sate
the contracting party for use or damage, unless overreaching by the other party is involved. For a
more comprehensive discussion, see SAMUEL M.t DAVIS Er AL., CHILDREN INTHE LEGA.L Sysat:
CASES AND MATERIALS 101-06 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, 269 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980);

Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. v. Lee, 250 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio CL App. 1969); Dodson v. Shrader, 824
S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1992); Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. 1980); sce also RoBERT E.
Scott & DOUGLAS L. LEsLIE, CONTRAcr LAw AND THEORY 366-79 (2d ed. 1993).
24. Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288,290 (Vis. 1968).
25. See ELLEN RYERSON, TiE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERIcA'S JuVENtLE COLURT E.xmrTtE'.tr

36-37 (1978).
26. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from
Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUV%';ILE
JUSTICE 294, 326-27 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter Yotnt o.
TRIAL].
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As Ben Lindsay, an early judge of the Denver Juvenile

Court, declared, "our laws against crime [are] as inapplicable to children
as they would be to idiots." ' Even contemporary advocates for criminal
punishment implicitly acknowledge that children, because of their

immaturity, are less blameworthy than adults. In arguing that young
offenders be held to adult standards of criminal responsibility, they make
the problem disappear at least at a rhetorical level by simply describing
young offenders as adults and not children."
A third category of legal policies directed at children includes
explicit and implicit legal protections and entitlements that respond to
children's dependency. The law requires parents and the state to provide

children with support, care, and education--services needed for
survival and development, that children are unable to provide for

themselves. Parental child support obligations, public welfare support,
Medicaid, and Head Start programs provide a safety net that is designed
to assure that children's basic needs are met. Public school education

(including educational services to disabled children) is an entitlement in
all states, providing all children with the opportunity to develop the
capacities needed to become productive citizens.3 Under the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,32 Congress requires all states
to provide educational services to disabled children." Moreover, because

27. Proportionality requires that punishment be proportionate to the harm caused and the
blameworthiness of the offender. Children are assumed not to be blameworthy moral agents. See
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the RelationshipBetween Legal and
MoralAccountability,39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1521 (1992).
28. BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O'HIGGINS, THE BEAST 133 (University of Washington
Press 1970) (1909).
29. See, e.g., Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System
Needs an Overhaul, 34 POL'Y REv. 65, 68 (1985) ("IThere is no reason that society should be more
lenient with a 16-year-old first offender than a 30-year-old first offender."); Virginia Ellis, Lungren
to Seek Lower Age for Trial as Adult, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at A3 (quoting California Attorney
General Dan Lungren: "'[If you commit an adult crime, you'd better be prepared to do adult
time'); Jon R. Sorensen, Pataki Plan on Juvenile Offenders Includes Longer Sentences in Adult
Jails, BuFFALO NEws, Dec. 10, 1995, at A16 (quoting New York Governor Pataki: "'Adult crime
should mean adult time"').
30. See Scott & Scott, supra note 15.
31. See 20 U.S.C. § 5801(5) (1994) (calling for "new initiatives at the [flederal, [s]tate, local,
and school levels to" enable students "to succeed in the world of employment and civic
participation"); id. § 5812(3)(A) (delineating National Education Goals, specifically that "every
school in America will ensure that all students learn to use their minds well, so they may be
prepared for responsible citizenship"); id. § 6301(a)(1) ("[D]eclar[ing] it to be the policy of the
United States" to provide "a high-quality education for all individuals," because education is "a
societal good" and "a moral imperative.").
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. IV 1999).
33. See id. § 1412.
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children are vulnerable and unable to assert their own interests, the state
enforces the parents' duty to provide adequate care through elaborate
civil and criminal child abuse and neglect regulation. This system not
only provides incentives for parents to identify their own interests with
those of their children, but also offers the necessary substitute care,
when parents fail egregiously in their responsibilities.1
Taken together, this complex network of legal regulation suggests
that policy makers view children as a very special class of citizens, a
group whose unique traits and circumstances warrant a different
regulatory scheme from that which applies to adults. In general, these
policies of restricted rights and privileges, limited responsibility, and
special protections are grounded firmly in a consistent account of what it
means to be a child.
B. Adolescence in Legal Rhetoric
No one thinks that adolescents are similar to toddlers in their
reasoning and judgment, dependency, or vulnerability. The empirical
assumptions about developmental immaturity that shape the legal
images of childhood do not fit comfortably with conventional notions of
adolescence. As compared with younger children, adolescents are close
to adulthood. They are physically mature, and most have the cognitive
capacities for reasoning and understanding necessary for making rational
decisions." Yet, adolescents are not fully formed persons in many
regards; they continue to be dependent on their parents and on society,
and their inexperience and immature judgment may lead them to make
poor choices, which threaten harm to themselves or others.7'

34. See Scott & Scott, supra note 15,at 2449.

35. Jean Piaget concluded that the highest stage of cognitive development (the Laparity to
engage in formal operational thindng) is attained by mid-adolescence. See BARBEL INHELDER &
JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENcE: Al
ESSAY ON THE CONSRUcnON OF FORtAL OPERATIONAL STRUCrURES xiii (Anne Parsons &
Stanley ilgran trans., 1958). At this point, youths are capable of hypothetical reasoning

(comparing the consequences of two alternatives). See generally id.;
JOatH. FLAVELL ET AL.,
COGNHTIVE DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1993) (describing Piaget's contributions to cognitive theory).

Although most modem cognitive psychologists do not believe that cognitive development is stagelike, but rather proceeds at different rates in different domains, by age fourteen or fifteen,
adolescents come close to cognitive maturity in many realms. See ROBERTS. SIEGLER, CtI.Dae;'s

THIMMG 53 (1986); William Gardner et al., Asserting ScientificAuthority: Cognitive De elopna.nt
andAdolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGISr 895,897 (1989).
36. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts,
19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 226-27 (1995); see also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20
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Conventional wisdom about adolescence generally tracks scientific

knowledge about human development-individuals in this group are
proceeding through a developmental stage between childhood and
adulthood-they are neither children nor adults."

Although lawmakers have occasionally recognized the distinctive
character of adolescence," more typically this transitional stage is
invisible, and adolescents are incorporated into the binary legal
categories of childhood or adulthood. For many purposes-voting,
military service, domicile, contracting, and entitlement to support-

adolescents are legal children until a bright line age of majority
transforms them into adults. For other purposes, adult status is attained
either before the age of majority (driving), or after (drinking)."
When extending legal rights or responsibilities to minors is the
subject of policy debate, adolescents are usually described either as
children or as mature adults-depending upon the desired classification.
Abortion jurisprudence provides a good example of the elusiveness of
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 259-60 (1996) (explaining that the tendency for adolescents to make

poor choices, which may create danger might be attributed to the development of temperance).
37. See generally JOHN DACEY & MAUREEN KENNY, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (2d ed.
1997); DOUGLAS C. KIMMEL & IRVING B. WEINER, ADOLESCENCE: A DEVELOPMENTAL
TRANSION (1985); DAVID R. SHAFFER, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: CHILDHOOD AND
ADOLESCENCE (2d ed. 1989); NORMAN A. SPRINTHALL & W. ANDREW COLLINS, ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW (3d ed. 1995); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman,
The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful
Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 389 (1999).
38. An example is creative regulation of motor vehicle licensing. Youths aged sixteen can get
drivers licenses in most states, but in some states, the privilege is subject to some restrictions until
adulthood. For example in California, Maryland, and Nebraska, minors cannot drive after midnight
unless supervised by certain adults. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 12814.6 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSP. § 16-113 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60-4,120.01 (Michie Supp. 2000). This driving
curfew is even earlier in other states. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:416.1 (West 2000) (11
p.m.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-11 (1999) (9 p.m.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-175 (Law. Co-op. 1999)
(daylight hours only); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-12 (Michie 2000) (8 p.m.). This trend, adopted
or being adopted in many states, is called "graduated licensing" and involves a three-step process: a
minor must first get a restricted learner's permit and then a restricted provisional license before
receiving a "full" unrestricted license as an adult. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN, § 321.180B (West
1999); D.C. Act 13-190 (D.C. Code Supp. 2000) (graduated licensing to take effect beginning Sept.
1, 2000). The State of New York is unusual in that it varies its restrictions depending on the region
of the state. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 501(3)(c) (Consol. 2000) (indicating that minors are not
permitted to drive within the limits of New York City). Thus, in these states, adolescents are
accorded an adult privilege, but with restrictions that acknowledge that they are not ready to assume
full adult responsibilities.
Another context in which adolescents are distinguished from younger children is in the
adjudication of child custody disputes. In most states, the preferences of teens regarding custody is
given greater weight than are those of younger children. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's
Preferencein Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (1988).
39. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-1 (West 1993).
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adolescence in legal rhetoric. When the Supreme Court recognizes
parental authority and other constraints on the rights of pregnant minors,
teens are described as children. In Bellotti . Baird," for example, Justice
Powell points to the vulnerability of children, their lack of experience,
perspective, and judgment, and the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children as the basis for limiting adolescent abortion
rights.' In contrast, advocates who favor conferring adult abortion rights
on teens present quite a different image of pregnant adolescents. In H.L.
v. Matheson,4 2 for example, Justice Marshall argued (in dissent) that
Utah's statutory restrictions amounted to a state-created "obstacle to the
'
exercise of the minor woman's free choice."43
In general, both advocates and lawmakers ignore the developmental
realities of adolescence, and endorse fictional accounts in which
adolescents are either immature children (and thus dependant,
incompetent, and vulnerable), or mature adults (and thus self-sufficient,
competent, and responsible). This does not mean, however, that such
binary classification is generally bad policy, or that it disserves the
interests of adolescents. To the contrary, this approach works well for
the most part. To a considerable extent, classification of adolescents as
children (for most purposes) or adults (for some purposes) constitutes a
coherent and socially beneficial scheme.
Ell. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN LEGAL
CHILDHOOD AND ADULTHOOD

As I have suggested, children cross over the line to legal adulthood
at different ages for different purposes. The baseline, of course, is the
age of majority, the age at which presumptive adult legal status is
attained. However, a complex regime of age grading defines childhood
as a category with multiple boundaries. Youths charged with murder can
be tried as adults at age ten or younger in many statesn and high school
40. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
41. See id. at 634, 643. Despite this rhetoric, however, Justice Powell acknodledges that
many adolescents may be sufficiently mature to make their owni abortion decisions. See id. at 643
n.23. Bellotti requires that a minor be given the opportunity (through a hearing) to demonstrate her
maturity and ability to make an autonomous decision. See id. at 643. infra text accompanying no:ts
107-13.
42. 450 U.S. 395 (1981).
43. Id. at441 (iarshall, J,dissenting).
44. See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 62.040 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 19991 iproviding that the
juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over persons accused of murder. %%ithoutregard to age),
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506 (Supp. 2000) (stating that children age ten and up may be transferred
to adult court if charged wvith certain enumerated offenses including, but not limited to. murder.
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students can obtain contraceptives without parental permission." On the
other hand, non-custodial parents may be obliged to contribute to their
children's college expenses 6 and young adults cannot drink or run for
Congress." What explains this variation?
The logic of the multiple boundaries of childhood is far from
obvious. Most straightforwardly, age grading can be explained as a
function of different maturity requirements in different legal domains.
Both youths and society benefit if adult legal status is conferred when
(and only when) young citizens are capable of fulfilling the law's
expectations. Thus, no one would challenge that the maturity demanded
to fulfill the role of president (currently limited to citizens age thirty-five
or older) is greater than that needed to drive a car or vote. However,
perusal of the scheme of regulations suggests that, although crude
assumptions about maturity play an important role, age grading policies
are often shaped by other considerations as well. Examination of specific
policies suggests that lines are drawn on the basis of a number of diverse
policy concerns. Concern about youth welfare, protection of parental
authority, and societal benefit are all a part of the mix, as is
straightforward administrative convenience. On issues such as abortion
access, political controversy and compromise have played a powerful
role in the way in which the boundary of childhood is set. In the
discussion that follows, I examine the complexity of age grading, and
extract some lessons from the diverse responses that policy makers have
offered to the question: "When does childhood end?"
A.

The CategoricalApproach-Age ofMajority

1. The Logic of a Presumptive Age of Majority
The age of majority is the natural place to begin. The common law
age of majority was twenty-one, apparently because, in the Middle Ages,
most men were presumed capable of carrying armor at this age.4"

aggravated assault, and kidnapping); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 938.183 (west 2000) (providing that adult
court has original jurisdiction over juveniles age ten and over who are alleged to have attempted to
commit or committed murder).
45. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
46. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
47. The minimum age for service in the House of Representatives is twenty-five. U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 2. For the Senate, it is thirty. See id. § 3.
48. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S. REP. No.
92-26, at 5 (1971); VIRGINIA GRACE COOK, THE AGE OF MAJoRrrY 6 (1972) (describing the
historical development of the age of majority).

2000]

LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OFADOLESCENCE

Currently, legal adulthood begins at age eighteen." This milestone
signals the end of parental authority and responsibility, as well as the
withdrawal of the state from its protective parens patriae role. The

financial support obligation of parents generally ends when children
attain the age of majority, as does parents' common law right to their

children's earnings 50 The safety net of government support and
protection is also terminated; for the most part, federal and state

financial support, medical services, and abuse and neglect jurisdiction
end when children become legal adults at age eighteen."'

On reaching the age of majority, individuals acquire most of the
legal capacities necessary to function as citizens and members of
society. Legal adults have the right to make decisions about domicile

and medical treatment, and the legal capacity to enter binding contracts,
sign leases, purchase real estate, and make wills.52 Upon attaining the age

of majority, individuals are also accorded the rights and privileges of
citizens, including the right to serve on juries and (perhaps of greatest

symbolic importance) the right to vote..

The designation of a categorical legal age of majority can be

understood as reflecting a crude judgment about maturity and
competence. Individuals at the specified age are assumed to be mature
enough to function in society as adults, to care for themselves, and to
make their own self-interested decisions. Before this threshold is
crossed, authority to make these decisions rests largely either with the
49. For example, the Virginia Code provides:
For the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth [of Virginia] including common law.
case law and statutory law, unless an exception is specifically provided in this Code, a
person shall be an adult, shall be of full age and shall reach the age of majority vhen he
becomes eighteen years of age.
VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42(b) (Aichie 1995). In California. "[ain adult is an individual %%hois 18
years of age or older." CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West 1994).
50. Some states have adjusted the age for terminating the parental support obligation to
accommodate the post-majority dependency of college students. See infra text accompanyoing notes
71-73.
51. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(1) (1994) (indicating that "child" for purposes of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act means person under age eighteen); 42 U.S.C. § 619(2)
(Supp. In 1998) (defining "minor child" for purposes of the Social Security Act to include children
under eighteen or those under nineteen who attend post-secondary or vocational school full-time);
FIA. STAT. ANN. § 39.41(2)(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (stating that jurisdiction over depzndent
children ends at age eighteen); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-I (West 1994) (proiiding that
abuse and neglect jurisdiction extends to minors under age eighteen); NJ. STAT. Ar1a. § 9:6-8.21
(West 2000) (defining abused or neglected child to mean a child under age eighteen); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-103(l)(a) (Supp. 2000) (providing that an abused or neglected child includes a minor
under age eighteen).
52. See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
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parents, who can be assumed to act in the child's interest, or with the
state. Empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports that
by age eighteen (and certainly by age twenty-one), most individuals
attain the presumed adult competence in many domains 4 Although the

process of psychological development and maturing continues into the
adult years, there are only modest differences between late adolescents
and adults in decision-making capacity." In fact, one likely effect of the

categorical approach is that minors will sometimes continue to be treated
as legal children when they are competent to make decisions or perform

adult functions. For this reason, this approach has been challenged,
sometimes successfully, on the ground that it deprives competent youths
of the ability to exercise rights and privileges that adult citizens enjoy."
The use of a bright line rule to designate the end of childhood
ignores individual variations in developmental maturity as well as
varying maturity demands across the range of legal rights and
responsibilities. Nonetheless, it generally functions quite well. For most

purposes, no great harm results from postponing adult legal status until
the designated age, or from giving parents legal authority and thereby

involving them in their adolescent children's lives. Most adolescents
have no pressing need to execute contracts, and if they do, parental
involvement is probably desirable in most cases. Moreover, an extended
dependency period offers benefits in the form of entitlement to support

54. See Steinberg & Cauffman, supranote 36, at 255.
55. Developmental research indicates that most persons, by age sixteen, have "the ability to
engage in hypothetical and logical decision-making ....to demonstrate reliable episodic
memory ....to extend thinking into the future.. . , to engage in advanced social perspectivetaking ....and to understand and articulate one's motives and psychological state." Steinberg &
Cauffman, supra note 37, at 402. Generally, late adolescence (ages seventeen to nineteen) is marked
by the ability to delay gratification, to think ideas through, to make independent decisions, to
compromise, and to set goals. See Normal Adolescent Develelopment, Am.ACAD. OF CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL., at http:lleducation.indiana.edulcas/adol/development.html. Accompanying
these abilities is greater self-reliance and emotional stability, a higher level of concern for the future,
and acceptance of social institutions and cultural traditions. See id.
56. See Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood"for Adolescents: Autonony and Privac*y as
Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 99-100 (1983); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B.
Campbell, The Competency of Children andAdolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53
CHILD DEv. 1589, 1589-90 (1982). In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), the Supreme Court
accepted the claim that mature minors should not be deprived of abortion rights. See id. at 647. Not
all challenges using developmental arguments have been successful. The Supreme Court has
sometimes rejected developmental arguments against abortion restrictions. In Hartigan v. Zbaraz,
484 U.S. 171 (1987), the Court rejected the developmental argument of the American Psychological
Association ("APA"). See id. at 172; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological
Association at 13-15, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673) [hereinafter APA
Brief].
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and other protections of childhood." Indeed, if maintaining parents'
enthusiasm for their obligations toward their children is important,
retention of parental authority may be worthwhile-as long as parents
have no serious conflict of interest with their children."3 Political support
for special governmental benefits for children and adolescents may also
be strengthened by maintaining the bright line between childhood and
adulthood for most purposes."9
A bright line age of majority is a clear signal; all who deal with the
young person understand that he does-or does not-have legal
capacity. A more tailored approach that attempts to confer adult status in
different domains on the basis of a more targeted assessment of maturity
is likely to generate uncertainty and error. Moreover, it almost certainly
would be administratively less efficient. A strategy of customized age
grading introduces complexity and cost to legal policy, as it involves
multiple judgments about the appropriate maturity threshold for a broad
range of tasks and functions. Most cumbersome of all would be an
approach that confers adult legal rights or responsibilities on the basis of
individualized assessments of maturity. Because such a strategy is costly
and burdensome, predictably it is only employed when the stakes are

high.6
The upshot is that a categorical approach that treats individuals
below a designated age as legal minors for most purposes works well,
despite some inevitable distortion of the developmental capacities of
young persons, as long as that age corresponds roughly to some
threshold of developmental readiness to assume the responsibilities and
privileges of adulthood. Because of the advantages of this categorical
approach, variations that depart from the presumptive age should attract
our interest. These variations can be explained as serving some political

57. See Scott, supranote 8, at 1667-69.
58. In earlier work. Robert Scott and I develop this argument. Withdrawing parental authority
and autonomy (either by extensive state supervision or by treating children as legal adults) may

undermine parents' motivation to fulfill their obligations. See Scott & Scott, supra note 15, at 2430.
59. Although policies that treat youths as children for some purposes and adults for others
might be perfectly coherent, the public may believe that there should be rough parity betwezn rights
and responsibilities. See Scott, supra note 8. at 1611. Thus. children's rights advocates in the 1960;

who argued for broad rights of self-determination for adolescents (often on the ground that they
were very like adults in their capacities), may have undermined the effectiveness of arguments for
lenient policies toward youth crime. See id. at 1607.

60. Individualized hearings are used to determine %Nhetherparticular young persons should be
treated as legal adults or as children in at least txvo contexts. First, many statutes regulating
adolescents' access to abortion provide for judicial by-pass hearings to eoaluate maturity. See infra
text accompanying notes 106-13. Also, one means of deciding whether youths accused of crimes
will be tried as adults is the judicial transfer hearing. See infra text aceompanying notes 145-47.
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or social goal that would be undermined by adherence to the
conventional boundary of childhood.
2. Determining the Age of Majority-The Passage of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment
What determines the location of the presumptive boundary between
childhood and adulthood? Clearly, it is based on some rough assessment
about the level of maturity required to function as an adult in society, but
(also clearly) no single age is dictated by developmental considerations.
In the past generation, the boundary has shifted downward, in response
to the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, lowering the age at
which citizens have a right to vote in federal and state elections. The
social and political forces that led to this constitutional reform, and the
arguments made in support of its passage, provide an interesting lesson
about the way in which the presumptive boundary of childhood is
drawn.
The right to vote has long been the defining marker of legal
adulthood and the age of majority has been linked with this important
symbol of full-fledged citizenship. Like many other legal rights, the
right to vote is withheld from minors because of assumptions about
developmental immaturity. It is assumed that education and an informed
understanding of the issues are important to political participation in a
democracy, and that adults are more likely to meet these criteria than
children and adolescents. 6' Although this assumption may not hold in
d -many
many cases
adolescents would be better informed voters than
many adults-the withholding of the right to vote from minors has
generated little controversy in recent years. This is probably because of a
combination of two factors suggested above. The administrative cost of
identifying minors who are "competent" to exercise their voting rights

61. For a comprehensive discussion on the history of the voting age in America, see
WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH'S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF VOTING AGE IN
AMERICA (1992). In this work, Ian McGowan, then-Executive Director of Youth Franchise
Coalition, states that eighteen was a better age for voting than sixteen or seventeen because eighteen
is the age that most persons graduate from high school and take on adult responsibilities. See id. at
105-06. But see Why Not Seventeen?, 22 NAT'L REv. 244, 245 (1970) ("We can't think of a single
argument for a voting age of eighteen that doesn't apply just as well to seventeen."). For an
overview of why eighteen-year-olds deserved the vote, see SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18, S. REP. No. 92-26, at 5-7 (1971).
62. See Melton, supra note 56, at 100-01. Thus, voting rights were not an issue in the
children's rights movement in the 1960s, when advocates argued for broad self-determination rights
for adolescents.
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would be substantial, and the cost of postponing the opportunity to
exercise voting rights does not seem to be a great deprivation.P
If the latter point is true, how can we explain the extensive effort
undertaken in the late 1960s to amend the United States Constitution to
extend voting rights to eighteen-year-old citizens?' First, the political
context and climate were important. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was
enacted in the midst of the Vietnam War, when many legal minors
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were drafted into military
service and sent into battle. Moreover, across the country, college
students involved in the civil rights and anti-war protest movements
demonstrated an interest in political participation and a commitment to
social change. The Senate committee that recommended the enactment
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment emphasized these political facts!" It
also emphasized that the young adults who would be enfranchised under
the new amendment were "mentally and emotionally capable of full
participation in our democratic form of government." Finally, the report
noted that legal minors were treated as adults for the purposes of
criminal responsibility and punishment in all states, and that many were
engaged in adult roles as employees and taxpayers. The common law
age of majority was dismissed as a matter of historical accident.'
Several points about this political initiative are interesting. First, the
Amendment's supporters believed it was important to emphasize that the
common law boundary between childhood and adulthood distorted
developmental reality. The argument for lowering the age of majority
was based in part on an empirical claim that, for most purposes,
psychological maturity was achieved by age eighteen, suggesting a view
that legal status should follow intuitions about developmental maturity.!7
Another important theme is that parity should exist between rights and
responsibilities. On this view, fairness required the extension of voting
rights to eighteen-year-olds because they were subject to the most
onerous responsibility of citizenship (military service) and were often
held legally accountable for their behavior under criminal law.t' There is
63. See supranote 60 and accompanying text.

64. For a discussion of the political movement that led to the passage of the Twnty-Si:%th
Amendment, see CULTICE, supra note 61. Cultice describes a youth movement to lower the voting
age in the late 1960s, that became nationally recognized as LUV (Let Us Vote), and spread to over
3000 high schools and 400 colleges. See id.

65. See SENATE COmm. ON ThE JUDICIARY, LOwRING THE VOTING AGE TO 18. S. REP. No.
92-26, at 6.

66. See i& at7.
67. See id. at 5.

68. See U at 6.
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little question that the image of young persons dying for their country in
Vietnam who were not deemed mature enough to participate in elections
carried much symbolic weight in the political process. It goes a long way
towards explaining the timing of this constitutional reform. Finally, this
reform reveals the extent to which legal childhood and adulthood are
social and political constructs, rather than simply products of scientific
understanding of human development. One implicit goal of the reform
was to reconceptualize college student protesters from immature
troublemakers who were "outside the system" into citizens with a stake
in democratic processes. The broader point, of course, is that young
persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of age were recast as
legal adults in large part because of circumstances in the social and
political environment.
3.

The Limitations of the Categorical Approach-The Case of
Child Support
After the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971, the age
of majority was lowered to age eighteen for many other purposes,
through legislative and judicial action at the state and federal level.'
Although much of this reform was uncontroversial, in one area, the legal
change was quite problematic. Many courts interpreted the legal reform
to require that non-custodial parents' obligation to provide financial
support for their minor children must end at age eighteen (because by
definition, recipients were no longer minors)." The impact of this
downward shift suggests why a bright line rule defining the boundaries
of childhood sometimes is inadequate.
The issue of when child support obligations should end continues to
be a subject of debate. In many ways, modem eighteen-year-olds are
ready to function as legal adults. However, college attendance has
69. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42 (Michie 1995);
Charles F. Willson, Note, But Daddy, Why Can't I Go to College? The Frightening De-Kine of
Support for Children's Post-Secondary Education, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1101-02 (1996)
(discussing the role of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in the lowering of the age of majority).
70. Some state courts have found that divorced parents are not obligated to pay for their
children's college expenses because they are only responsible during the child's minority. See
Cariseo v. Cariseo, 459 A.2d 523, 524 (Conn. 1983); Jones v. Jones, 257 S.E.2d 537, 538 (Ga.
1979); Peterson v. Peterson, 319 N.W.2d 414, 414 (Minn. 1982). Other states do not extend child
support to college expenses because married parents would not have the same obligation. See
Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480, 483 (Alaska 1984); In re Marriage of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165,
167 (Colo. 1987); Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1984); Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265,
270 (Pa. 1995) (holding legislation allowing for post-majority support for college by non-custodial
parents to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution).
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become the norm as preparation for a successful life,7' extending the
period of financial dependency on parents for many young people. If the
lowering of the age of majority to age eighteen (when many children are
still in high school) signifies the end of parents' legal obligation to
provide financial support to their children, many children will obtain a
college education only with great difficulty-if at all. In intact families,
parents who have the financial means usually support their children's

college education, implicitly acknowledging that, in this domain, an
extension of childhood status is important to their children's welfare.

Non-custodial parents may be less likely to identify their own interest
with that of children with whom they no longer share a home. This may
justify imposing a legal obligation on these parents to act towards their
children as they would had the family remained together-even though
no such legal obligation is imposed on parents in intact families. In fact,

non-custodial parents often are subject to formal legal mandates not
applicable to parents in intact families-support for a minor child's
private school education, for example.2 A legal directive is necessary
because non-custodial parents cannot be counted on to act in their
children's interest.

Some courts and legislatures have authorized the extension of
parents' child support obligation beyond the age of majority to provide
financial support for college." The underlying premise is that children's
71. "[Flew things are as certain as that people vith more education earn more money."
Education and Earnings: 1987, 35 OCCUPATIONAL OLrILOOK Q. 25. 25 (1991). According to the
Census Bureau, persons with degrees beyond high school earn, on average, more than tvice that of
persons who hold only a high school diploma ($2339 vs. S1080 mean monthly earnings). See
Rosalind R. Bruno, What's It Worth?: Field of Training and Economic Status: 1993. U.S. Bureau of
the Census, CURRENT PoPULATION REP., ser. P70-51. at 1 (1995).
72. See e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 576D-7 (1993) (stating that private school expenses can bLe
considered when calculating child support payments); L-. REV. STAT. A,'N. § 9:315.6(11 (West
2000) (providing that the expense of a special or private school may be added to the basic child
support obligation "to meet the particular educational needs of the child[renl); Litmans v. Litmans,
673 A.2d 382, 395 (Pa. Super. CL 1996) (noting that divorced parents have a duty to provide for
their minor child's private school education as long as such an education is a reasonable expense).
But see Rizzo v. Rizzo, No. FA 90-0439639S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS. 592, at "4 (Conn. Super.
Ct.Feb. 8, 1996) ("[R]equiring the non-custodian parent to pay for expenses for a child's attendance
at a private school ... is generally not a support obligation of a parent."). See generally He fers %.
Jones, 672 A.2d 1299, 1310 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (listing criteria used in vaz)ing
jurisdictions to determine when the non-custodial parent must pay for private school epens..sL
73. See LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350. 1358 (N.t 1993) (upholding legislation requiring
college support for children of non-custodial parents): Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 269
(Wash. 1978) (holding that the non-custodial parent must pay college costs after the statute %ias
changed to read "dependent" rather than "minor"); see also IRA MARK Ewwti Err
AL, FAmttLY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLFNiS

499-501 (1998); Glen A. Smith, Note, Educational Support

Obligationsof NoncustodialParents,36 RUTGERS L REV. 588. 618 (1984) (explaining that som
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financial dependency on their parents as they acquire a college education
justifies extending the legal boundary of childhood beyond its
presumptive limit. The recognition by lawmakers that, in this domain,
older adolescents are not autonomous adults enhances general social
welfare (by creating more educated citizens), as well as the welfare of
youths who receive the benefit.
B. Medical Decision-Making-A Case Study in
Legal Line Drawing
The legal regulation of medical treatment of children and
adolescents conforms, in general, to the categorical approach, under
which childhood ends at the age of majority. There are many exceptions,
however, under which adolescents are given adult status. In the
regulation of abortion, moreover, some states have adopted procedures
that implicitly create a special category for adolescents. In its variation
and complexity, the legal regulation of minors' access to medical
treatment offers a rich context in which to examine the construction of
the legal boundaries of childhood.
Most medical treatment of minors requires the consent of their
parents. 7' Thus, adolescents cannot obtain routine medical treatment on
their own, and, unlike adults, cannot refuse treatment that their
physicians and parents conclude is necessary." The basis for parental
authority in this area is relatively straightforward. Medical treatment
must be based on competent informed consent-otherwise the treatment
provider commits a battery on the patient.76 Because minors are
presumed incompetent to give informed consent, parental consent is
necessary. Although developmental psychology evidence indicates that
older minors are mature enough in their cognitive development to make
states have extended the support obligation based on the idea that college is necessary to succeed
and is attended after children have reached the age of majority).
74. See Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protectingthe Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in
Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2075 (1996); Weithom &
Campbell, supranote 56, at 1589.
75. See id. Whether many physicians would provide non-essential medical treatment to an
objecting adolescent on the basis of parental consent is uncertain. For example, if parents were
intent on their protesting child receiving cosmetic plastic surgery, most surgeons likely would
decline to perform the surgery. The American Academy of Pediatrics guidelines advise against
treatment under these circumstances. See Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of
Pediatrics, Informed Consent, ParentalPermission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice (RE9g510), 95
PEDIATRICS 314, 315-16 (1995).
76. See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 336 (Kan.
1970) ("A surgical operation on the body of a person is a technical battery or trespass, regardless of
its result, unless the person or some authorized person consents to it.").
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competent medical decisions," giving parents legal authority usually
makes good sense. It reduces uncertainty and cost for medical service
providers who would otherwise need to assess the competence of their
young patients. Beyond this, legal authority over health care decisions
encourages parents to fulfill their general responsibilities to provide for
their children's welfare-and to pay their children's medical bills! Most
medical treatments present no conflict of interest; parents can be counted
on to have their children's interests at heart in making treatment
decisions. Thus, in requiring parental consent for most medical
treatments, lawmakers adopt the traditional boundary of childhood for
the conventional reasons.
1. The Mature Minor Doctrine and Minors' Consent Statutes
There are many exceptions to this general rule, however. The
requirement of parental consent is set aside under certain circumstances
and for particular kinds of treatment, giving adolescents legal authority
to make their own medical decisions. The policy objectives of these
exceptions vary, but most involve circumstances in which general social
welfare and the welfare of the young person needing treatment would be
undermined if parental consent were required and the traditional
boundary of childhood were maintained.
Historically, the most well established of these exceptions is the
mature minor doctrine." Under this doctrine, legally valid consent can be
obtained from an older competent minor for routine beneficial medical
treatment or in an emergency situation. This exception facilitates
necessary treatment when parental consent may be hard to get, under
circumstances in which it is assumed that parents would likely consent.
It also protects medical providers from liability for what may be only
technical violations of the informed consent requirement.O
Aside from the general mature minor rule, legislatures in many
states have enacted more targeted statutes, under which minors are
deemed adults for the purpose of consenting to particular kinds of
treatments. These typically include birth control and treatment for
77. See Melton, supranote 56, at 101; Weithom & Campbell, supra note 56, at 1595-96.
78. See Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: 77Te Age of Consent, II OSGOODE
HALL LJ. 115, 120-21 (1973) (discussing the states which as early as the mid-196th passed mature
minor laws, which include: Mississippi, 1966; Alabama, 1972; Virginia, 1972; and Texas. 1972).
79. For a comprehensive discussion of the mature minor doctrine, see id. The principles of the
mature minor doctrine seem to be influential, even in jurisdictions that have not formally adopted
the doctrine. See Angela R. Holder, Minors' Rights to Consent to Medical Care. 257 JAMA 3400,
3400 (1987) (arguing that there have been very few cases in which a physician has been sued for
non-negligent care of an adolescent without parental consent).
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sexually transmitted diseases, substance abuse, mental health problems,
and pregnancy." Minors' consent statutes typically do not include a
minimum age at which a minor is deemed an adult, but, because of the
nature of the specified conditions and treatments, only adolescents are
likely to seek treatment. Implicitly, these laws assume that the young
patients are competent to consent to the treatment, an assumption that is
likely valid for mid-adolescents.
These statutes are curious in that they give minors adult legal status
out of concern for youthful vulnerability.8 No one argues that minors
should be deemed adults because they are particularly mature in making
decisions in these treatment contexts. Rather, the focus is on the harm of
requiring parental consent. The targeted treatments all involve situations
in which the traditional assumption-that parents can be counted on to
respond to their children's medical needs in a way that promotes the
child's interest-simply might not hold. For example, some parents may
become angry upon learning of their child's drug use or sexual activity.
Moreover, even if most parents would act to promote their children's
welfare, adolescents may be reluctant to get help if they are required to
inform their parents about their condition, either because they fear their
parents' reactions or because they do not want to disclose private
information.' Removing this obstacle encourages adolescents to seek
treatment that may be critically important to their health. Of course,
society also has an interest in reducing the incidence of sexually
transmitted diseases, substance abuse, mental illness, and teenage
pregnancy. Together, these social benefits largely explain why
lawmakers shift the boundary of childhood for the purpose of
encouraging treatment of these conditions.

80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(D) (Michie 1998) (providing that minors are deemed
adults for purposes of consenting to these treatments); see also ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1997) (stating
that a minor may consent to treatment for pregnancy, venereal disease, drug dependency, alcohol
toxicity, or any reportable disease); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1502, 1823, 1908 (West 1992
& Supp. 2000) (providing that a minor may consent to treatment for abuse of alcohol or drugs,
emotional or psychological problems, venereal disease, sexual assault, and family planning).
81. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (111.1989).
82. See Wadlington, supra note 78, at 122. But see Susan F. Newcomer & J. Richard Udry,
Parent-ChildCommunication and Adolescent Sexual Behavior, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 174
(1985) (stating "that teenagers are frequently ignorant of their parents' attitudes toward sex-related
issues" and minors' fears about parental reactions may not reflect the parents' actual beliefs or
attitudes). According to a 1980 study, requiring parental consent or notice before issuing
contraceptives to teenagers would "lead many of them to abandon contraception or to use less
effective methods." Aida Torres et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of
Family Planningand Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 291 (1980).
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2. The Battle Over Adolescents' Access to Abortion

In the generation since Roe v. Wade, 3 legislatures and courts have
struggled with the issue of whether the government can regulate access

to abortion for adolescents more restrictively than would be allowed for
adult women.' On this issue, the boundary between childhood and

adulthood has been the subject of intense legal and political controversy,
pitting advocates for adolescent self-determination, who describe
pregnant teens as adults, against conservatives who depict these minors

as children who should be subject to their parents' authority.s Both sides
care deeply about this issue, and both have a political agenda that is
linked to the larger ideological contest over abortion." Not surprisingly,
under these circumstances, the resulting legal framework is complex and
the product of political compromise. In many states, lawmakers

regulating adolescents' access to abortion reject the conventional
strategies of legislative line drawing and binary classification. Rather,
they treat adolescents as a distinct legal category, different from children
and adults, and employ judicial hearings to classify teens on a case-by-

case basis.Y I will argue that this costly regulatory scheme offers little in
the way of social benefit.

Many features of an adolescent's decision to terminate her
pregnancy distinguish abortion from routine medical decisions, and give
83. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

84. See Melton, supra note 56, at 101; Robert H. Mnookin. Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in
IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCAcY, LAW REFoRMi, AND PUBUC POLCY 149, 153 R.H.
Mnookin ed., 1985) (describing the advocacy movement against restrictions on adolescent abortion
and the challenge of a Massachusetts statute in Belloti v. Baird).
85. Language in Supreme Court opinions illustrates this rhetorical battle. See supra notes 4043 and accompanying text.
86. For example, the National Organization for Women, a prominent pro-choice group, has
actively opposed parental notification and consent laws. See Kristin Thomson, A Pro-Choice Viev
of Abortion Lavs, in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY: A DoCumtENTARY HISTORY 270 (Eva R.
Rubin ed., 1994). On the other hand, the Catholic Church and fundamentalist Protestant groups that
are opposed to abortion generally have advocated for restrictions on adolescent access to abortion,
including parental consent and notification provisions. See CYNTHIA GOoREY, ARTICLES OF FAmI:
A FRONTLjNE HISTORY OF THE ABORTION WARS 165 (1998); Basile J. Uddo, The Public Law of
Abortion: A Constitutionaland Statutory Review of the Present and Future Legal Landscape, in
ABORTION AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION WITHIN THE CATHOLIC
TRADITION 163, 175-76 (R. Randall Rainey et al. eds., 1996); see generally CzmR FOR
REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, TIPPING THE SCALES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHTs LEGAL CRUSADE
AGAINST CHOICE (1998).
87. Some states adhere to a standard binary classification, and adopt the approach of the
minors' consent statutes. See infra text accompanying note 97. Others would clearly choose to
classify pregnant minors as children, but are prevented from doing so by constitutional constraints
imposed by the Supreme Court. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52. 74-75 (19761
(striking down a parental consent requirement in a Missouri statute).
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rise to arguments that pregnant teens should be deemed adults in this
context. Advocates for self-determination in the abortion debate focus on
the constitutional importance of reproductive choice, and argue that most
adolescents possess the developmental maturity to make the decision on
their own.88 Moreover, there are some notable differences between the

right of privacy implicated in the abortion decision and other important
rights of citizens that are not extended to minors, regardless of their

competence. One justification for deferring many legal rights (the right
to vote, for example) until the age of majority is that postponement
results in no great deprivation. In contrast, the decision by the pregnant

teen about whether or not to have a child cannot be postponed, and it has
enormous consequences for the individual.89 Moreover, given the health

risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and the consequences for the girl's
future welfare, the paternalistic argument for making abortion available
to minors is a powerful one.
This line of analysis challenges the wisdom of the traditional

classification of adolescents as legal children in the abortion context, and
argues against governmental prohibition of access to abortion for
minors. But should parents be legally excluded from their traditional role

of making important decisions for their minor children?" In many
regards, the arguments for allowing minors to consent to abortion
without involving their parents are similar to those made in support of
minors' consent statutes. Here, as in the context of treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases or substance abuse, the interests of parents and

children may conflict. The pregnancy may be unwelcome evidence that
the child has rejected the parents' moral code. Moreover, some parents

may strongly oppose abortion on moral or religious grounds, and thus
refuse to consent to a procedure that they find abhorrent.9" In short, the

88. Gary Melton argues that adolescents are capable of making the abortion decision without
adult intervention, either parental or judicial-that research indicates that adolescents are not far
from adults in their decision-making capacity. See Melton, supra note 56, at 100-01. The APA
agreed. In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987), the
APA noted that adolescents do not differ from adults in their formal operational thinking-for
example, the ability to understand future consequences-and moral reasoning, and thus, that the
statutory restrictions at issue could not be justified. The Court was not persuaded by the
developmental argument. See APA Brief, supra note 56, at 13-15; see also Weithorn & Campbell,
supra note 56, at 1595 (noting findings of an abortion-specific study that shows adolescents age
fourteen and up to be just as capable as adults in making decisions about abortion).
89. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), Justice Powell noted this attribute of abortion.
See id. at 635, 640.
90. Most pregnant teens do consult with their parents before they seek abortion. See Torres et
al., supra note 82, at 287.
91. See id.
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parents' view of the right decision may be based on their own values and
interests rather than on concern for their child's health and welfare per
se. Even if this is not so, many teens may fear their parents' response
and postpone dealing with the pregnancy if parental involvement is
required for abortion.' This postponement could result in later (and
riskier) abortions. Under these circumstances, the state might
legitimately intervene to protect the child's welfare by allowing
adolescents to obtain an abortion without parental involvement.
An important difference between abortion and treatment for
substance abuse or sexually transmitted diseases, of course, is that the
abortion decision involves a highly contested moral choice that is absent
in those other treatments. There is only one right answer to the question
of whether a teen with a drug problem should get treatment' Many
would object to that description of the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
Thus, a core issue in classifying pregnant teens as adults or children is
whether parents (or courts) should have the authority to impose their
values on the pregnant adolescent or whether her values should be
determinative. In these terms, the argument for shifting the boundary of
childhood downward is straightforward. The pregnant teen possesses
sufficient maturity to make this decision, and indeed, if she completes
the pregnancy, she will be subject to the legal obligations of parenthood.
She also has the most important stake in the outcome. As Justice
Blackmun indicated in Roe v. Wade, an important justification for
giving control of this decision to the woman is that an unwanted
pregnancy imposes a substantial burden on the individual.r There is no
92. See e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 439 (1990) (stating that parental
notification may have an "adverse effecti] ... in the distressingly large number of cases in vhich
family violence is a serious problem"); Holder, supra note 79, at 3402 (stating that teenagers"

statements such as "'If my father finds out I'm pregnant, he'll kill me"' are not "alha)s adolsc-ent
hyperbole"); Suellya Scameechia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls:Decision fa.ng in Parental
Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75. 82 (1995) (noting that the teenage girl
"wil not want to tell her parents about the abortion because she wishes to avoid their anticipated
anger, disappointment, or humiliation").

93. See ZIMRING, supra note 8, at 64-65 (stating that a parent who refused to help his or her
child get treatment for venereal disease or substance abuse would be guilty of neglect).
94. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
95. In his landmark opinion, Justice Blaclanun described the substantial burden that an
unwanted pregnancy imposes on a woman:

Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may b-- taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the un%%anted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases .... the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
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reason to assume that this burden would be felt less acutely by an

adolescent than by an adult woman. Moreover, the burdens and health
risks of pregnancy and childbirth are even greater with the younger
teen.96 Thus, while her self-determination claim may be weaker, the
paternalistic argument that her parents' opposition to abortion should not
be dispositive is stronger.
The response of lawmakers to this controversial dilemma has
varied. Some states have adopted the approach of the minors' consent
statutes, classifying pregnant teens as adults for the purpose of making
this decision.' Others have downplayed the differences between

abortion and other medical decisions, and have sought to retain parental
authority to the extent possible.98 Over the last generation, the

constitutional parameters of minors' abortion rights have emerged in a
series of United States Supreme Court decisions." The resulting

Id. at 153.
96. See, e.g., Scamecchia & Field, supra note 92, at 112 (stating that abortion "should be
presumed to be in a younger teen's 'best interests' because of the higher risks of carrying a
pregnancy to term").
97. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-601 (West 1997) (deeming minors' consent sufficient,
after counseling); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577A-2 (1993) (providing that a minor has the capacity to
consent to abortion); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.02.100 (West 1998) (stating "that every
individual possesses a fundamental right of privacy with respect to personal reproductive
decisions," including abortion). New Hampshire has no restrictions on abortion.
98. See, e.g., Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 92, at 89, 118 (stating that thirty-three states
have laws in effect prohibiting minors from obtaining abortions in the absence of either parental
consent or notification, or a judicial by-pass). For an illustrative example of a parental notice statute,
see generally the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/15, 70/40
(West 1999) (stating that absent an exception, a physician will be subject to state disciplinary action
if he "willfully" performs abortions on minors without either "notice to an adult family member" or
judicial by-pass). An example of a parental consent statute is Michigan's Parental Rights Restoration
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.903, 722.905, 722.907 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (stating
that absent a medical emergency, "[a] person who intentionally performs an abortion" on a minor
without her parent/legal guardian's written consent or a consent waiver by the probate court shall be
"guilty of a misdemeanor").
99. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293 (1997) (upholding a parental
notification requirement, with judicial by-pass procedure); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US.
833, 839 (1992) (upholding a parental consent requirement, with judicial by-pass procedure); Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1990) (upholding a state law requiring
parental notification or consent, with judicial by-pass procedure); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417, 455 (1990) (upholding a requirement of notice to both parents, with by-pass procedure); City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440-41 (1983) (striking down a city
ordinance requiring parental consent without adequate by-pass procedure, and declaring that
persons under fifteen may not be presumed immature); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981)
(upholding a parental notice requirement in case of immature, dependent minor); Bellotti, 443 U.S.
at 647-50 (striking down a parental consent requirement with judicial discretion to require consent
for a mature minor); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (striking down a
parental consent requirement).
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constitutional framework authorizes states to subject adolescents to
procedural requirements that would clearly be unacceptable for adults."
At the same time, the Court has made clear that abortion is different
from other medical decisions, and that pregnant teens cannot be simply
classified as children subject to their parents' authority. 0 '
The Court has clarified (to some extent) the constitutional limits of
state regulation of adolescent abortion by proposing a procedural
framework that seeks to accommodate the competing interests of the
pregnant minor, her parents, and the state. Under this framework, states
must allow a mature minor to make the abortion decision without
parental consent, but can require that she demonstrate in a judicial
proceeding that she is mature enough to make the decision. " Even
younger teens cannot be legislatively presumed to be unable to make a
mature abortion decision. If the court finds a minor not to be mature, a
determination must be made (under the state's parenspatriaeauthority)
of whether authorizing abortion without parental involvement is in her
best interest.' (Of course, the minor who is willing to tell her parents
can obtain abortion with their consent.) The Supreme Court has also
upheld statutory requirements that give parents notice of their child's
abortion, without authority to withhold consent.'"
The heart of this regulatory scheme is the judicial by-pass hearing,
required in many states as a predicate to assigning adult status to the
pregnant minor 'OcUnder this approach, in contrast to most age grading
policies, the boundary between childhood and adulthood is not a
legislatively mandated bright line; rather, it is set by an individualized
100. See e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-35 (acknowledging the need to protect a child's
constitutional rights while recognizing "that the constitutional rights of children cannot b. equated

with those of adults [because of] the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner;, and the importance of the parental role in child

rearing").
101. See id. at 649 (explaining that if parental consent is denied, the minor must have recourse
to a prompt judicial determination of her maturity).
102. See id. at 647.
103. See Ci.y ofAL-ron,462 U.S. at 440.
104. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48.

105. The Court has upheld statutes requiring notice to both parents, even %%her, only one parent
lives with the child, as long as a by-pass hearing is available. See Hodgson v. Minnesota. 497 U.S.
417, 427 (1990); see also supra note 99 (discussing other opinions upholding statutory notice
requirements).
106. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-4 (1992); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.16.030 tMichie 2000); CAL
HAM.TH & SAFErY CODE § 123450 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 24. § 1784 11997); INDo.
CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4 (West 1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (WVest 2000); MO.S T.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-212 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8 (2000); 01xo RL. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.85 (Anderson 1998); VA. CODEANN. § 16.1-241(V) (Michie 1999).
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evaluation of the minor's maturity. In by-pass hearings, courts apply an
indeterminate legal standard, following Justice Powell's rather vague
prescription in Bellotti v. Bairdo' that the pregnant adolescent who "is
mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion
decision on her own" should be authorized to do so without parental
consent."8 Not surprisingly, perhaps, judicial judgments about where the
line between childhood and adulthood should be drawn often seem to
depend on attitudes about abortion and teen pregnancy. Some

conservative courts raise the bar very high, evaluating petitioners under
a standard for general maturity that most minors are unlikely to meet."
One is sometimes left to conclude that a "mature" minor would have
consulted with her parents (and thus have no need for the judicial bypass procedure), and probably would never have been foolish enough to

become pregnant." Other courts appear to rubber-stamp petitions by
pregnant teens. For example, Robert Mnookin found that Massachusetts

judges, called upon to implement a statute based on the guidelines set
forth by Justice Powell in Bellotti, almost invariably ordered abortion

without informing parents, even on the rare occasions when they
concluded that a petitioner was not a "mature minor.'"" These courts

appear to have been motivated largely by a paternalistic concern for the
health and welfare of pregnant minors, rather than by any deference for
107. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
108. Id. at 647. The proposal by advocates that an informed consent standard be the decision
rule has not been widely implemented. Advocates argue for this more determinate standard on the
ground that abortion is a medical procedure, and thus the maturity requirement should focus on
competence to make an informed treatment decision. See APA Brief, supra note 56, at 9. These
advocates argue further that developmental research supports that by mid-adolescence, teens have
the capacity for reasoning and understanding necessary to make an informed medical decision. See
id. at 14-15; Bruce Ambuel, Adolescents, Unintended Pregnancy,and Abortion: The Strugglefor a
Compassionate Social Policy, 4 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 4 (1995)
(recommending that the age for requiring parental consent be lowered from eighteen to fourteen to
accommodate existing psychological research on adolescents' capacity to consent to abortion). An
informed consent limits the ability of judges to make decisions on the basis of their own values and
attitudes.
109. See H.B. v. Wilkinson, 639 F. Supp. 952, 954 (D. Utah 1986) (outlining the factors to be
applied to determine "maturity," which are largely impractical).
110. For example, a Utah court rejected the petition of a seventeen-year-old who was described
as a good student, concluding that she lacked the requisite "experience, perspective and judgment."
Id. at 958. The court emphasized that she lived at home, engaged in sexual activity without
contraceptives, sought counsel from friends rather than family members or church officials, and
failed to recognize the long-term consequences of abortion. See id. at 955-56.
111. See Mnookin, supra note 84, at 239-40. Between 1981 and 1983, ninety percent of the
1300 petitioning minors in Massachusetts courts were deemed "mature." See id. at 239. In the rest
(with one exception), abortion without parental consent was determined to be in the minors' best
interest. That sole exception went to a neighboring state. See id. "Every pregnant minor who has
sought judicial authorization for an abortion has secured an abortion." Id. (emphasis omitted).
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adolescent autonomy."' As Mnooldn asks rhetorically: "[H]ow could the
judge determine that it is in the interest of a minor to give birth to a child
if she is too immature even to decide to have an abortion?"" 3
The legal framework endorsed by the Court can be understood as
an effort to find an acceptable resolution to a highly contested dispute
about the boundary of childhood-a dispute that has more to do with
conflicting attitudes about abortion itself than with views on parental
authority or the maturity or autonomy interests of adolescents. In
defining the constitutional restrictions on state authority to classify
adolescents as children in this context, the Court allows states to limit
adolescent abortion rights to a circumscribed group of mature
individuals. At the same time, it prohibits categorical classification of
pregnant teens as children solely on the basis of age. This regulatory
scheme, with its emphasis on the by-pass hearing, creates an elaborate
and costly procedural mechanism for classifying adolescents as children
or adults. In effect, however, the framework also creates a distinct legal
category for adolescents-and thus is a rare departure from the
conventional binary classification of adolescents as either adults or
children. On the one hand, even the mature pregnant teen is not quite an
adult; the requirement that she demonstrate her maturity creates a
substantive burden on her efforts to obtain abortion services that likely
would be unacceptable for adult women. Moreover, even mature teens
may be subject to parental notice requirements."" On the other hand,
traditional parental authority to make medical decisions for their
children is curtailed by the availability of the by-pass hearing and by the
right of mature minors to make their own decisions."'
The endorsement of this unique regulatory scheme may indicate
that, in this context, the Court recognizes that adolescents are neither
children nor fully mature adults. More clearly, the framework represents
an effort to accommodate competing legal and political interests on a
112. Under this approach, access to abortion is facilitated in much the same way (and for the
same reasons) as treatments covered by minors' consent statutes.

113. Mnookin, supra note 84, at 263.
114. The Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. In H.L v. Maltheson. 450 U.S. 393 (1931).
which upheld Utah's parental notification statute, the Court explicitly stated that it was not
considering the question of whether parental notice could be required for a mature minor. See id.
at
413. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the Virginia statute that requires notice to
all parents. See Planned Parenthood v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 1998). The court

reasoned that a notice requirement is less burdensome than a requirement of parental consent, and
thus, Supreme Court precedent did not rule out such a statute. See id. at 371-72.
115.

Moreover, under parental notice statutes, parents have no authority to overrida thzir

child's decision once they receive notice. See supra note 99 for a description of cases involing
notice statutes.
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sharply contested moral issue. It may be that, under these circumstances,
the Court deems the creation of an intermediate category to be the only
viable solution. Perhaps the endorsement of the by-pass hearing reflects
a view that the classification decision can be better resolved by courts
than in the politically-charged legislative arena. The Massachusetts
experience suggests that courts in that state usually classify minors as
adults to promote their welfare, a response that is conventional in other
settings. The process is costly and cumbersome, however, and the
statutory solution seems unsatisfactory to most observers." 6 There is
little evidence that it promotes the interests of pregnant teens or responds
to their developmental needs. The requirement of a by-pass hearing
leads to costly delay and seems likely to result in later abortions in many
cases-in part, because it will be viewed as an obstacle by many girls.
Moreover, under the by-pass model, judicial attitudes about abortion
may color decisions about maturity and best interest, creating
uncertainty and inconsistency. Setting aside the perceived need for
constitutional compromise, this regulatory framework has little to
recommend it. Legislatures adhering to the conventional objectives that
guide legal regulation of minors would focus on the health and welfare
of the pregnant teen and on the social costs of teen pregnancy. From this
perspective, the creation of an intermediate category of adolescence in
this context holds no apparent advantage over the legislative line
drawing and binary classification of the minors' consent statutes.
C. Summary
The law's approach to defining childhood turns out to be more
coherent than it at first appears. A categorical demarcation of the legal
age of majority functions quite well for most purposes, even though it
may not mirror the developmental transition to adulthood, or even most
adolescents for some purposes of many adolescents. When that line is
shifted, some important policy objective is being served. Legal
regulation lowering or raising the threshold of legal adulthood usually
reflects dual objectives; it serves both the public interest and the interest
of the adolescents who are classified either as legal adults or children.
Sometimes, as with laws extending parents' support obligation through
college, the goal of promoting the welfare of young persons seems to
predominate-although investment in education also carries societal
116. Robert Mnookin reports widespread dissatisfaction with the post-Bellotti Massachusetts
statute among judges, lawyers for minors, and health professionals. See Mnookin, supra note 84, at
243-64.
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benefits. In other contexts, policy makers pursue both paternalistic goals
and public protection. This is the case with the minors' consent laws and
with federal law which prohibits alcohol use by young persons over the
age of majority." 7 On the whole, legal policy facilitates the transition to
adulthood through a series of bright line rules that reflect society's
collective interest in young citizens' healthy development to productive
adulthood.
The legal framework seems to work well in another way. For the
most part, as I have suggested, lawmakers employ a rather simplistic
scheme that ignores developmental transition and categorizes
adolescents as either children or adults. Although some critics have
lamented this approach and argued for policies that are tailored to
respond to the exigencies of this developmental stage,"' there is little
evidence that, in most contexts, the interests of adolescents are harmed
by a regime of binary classification. Creating a separate legal category
for adolescents would add complexity, but generally with little promised
payoff. Indeed, the effect of a legal regime that includes a series of
legislative bright line rules is to extend adult rights and responsibilities
over an extended period of time into early adulthood, without incurring
the costs of establishing an intermediate category, or of undertaking a
case-by-case inquiry into maturity. Perhaps this is the lesson of abortion
regulation. In that context, burdensome procedural requirements create
social and administrative costs, and there is little evidence that the
welfare of adolescents is advanced through the creation of an
intermediate category. Occasionally, to be sure, useful exceptions to the
binary classification scheme are introduced. For example, under recent
statutory reforms, young drivers are accorded the adult privilege of
operating motor vehicles, subject to special restrictions as they gain
experience and learn responsibility." 9 In this setting, youth welfare and
social welfare are both served by the creation of an intermediate
category.
The legal account of childhood up to this point is for the most part a
success story. It is also a story with simple themes, in part because the
two important objectives in drawing the boundaries-promoting youth
117. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

118. The strongest objections have come from those %lho advocate treating adolescents as
adults for a broader range of legal purposes. See Melton, supranote 56. at 102.
119. For a description of these statutes, see supra note 38. Franklin Zimring adopted the
learner's permit metaphor in describing the law's optimal stance to adolescence. See ZtelReO,
supra note 8, at 89-90. He argues that adolescents should be permitted to gain exl~rience in adult

activities and decisions, but be protected from their mistakes and bad judgment. See id. at 90-93.
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welfare and social welfare-are straightforward and usually are aligned
in pointing toward a particular classification. In the next Part, I turn to
juvenile justice policy, a legal setting in which regulation has been less
successful, and in which, recently at least, these goals have been treated
as irreconcilable. Moreover, the standard strategies of binary
classification have not worked well in this setting, and the tendency to
ignore the developmental realities of adolescence has impeded the
creation of effective policies for more than a century.
IV.

JUVENILE CRIME AND THE DEFINITION OF CHILDHOOD

In the past one hundred years, legal policy towards youth crime has
undergone three periods of reform. The first period began with the
founding of the first Juvenile Court in Chicago in 1899.20 The goal of
the Progressive reformers was to create a separate court and correctional
system for juveniles that would focus solely on the welfare of young
offenders, with a goal of rehabilitation rather than punishment.' In the
1960s, a new wave of reform grew out of disillusion over the perceived
failure of rehabilitation as the basis of juvenile justice policy. After the
United States Supreme Court announced that due process was required
in delinquency proceedings," legislatures and law reformers introduced
the principle of accountability and recognized public protection as a goal
of juvenile justice policy. At the same time, they sought to retain the
unique character of the juvenile justice system, with its focus on youth
welfare." For approximately the past decade, policy makers have
responded to public fear of what is perceived to be a dramatic increase in

120. See RYERSON, supra note 25, at 4,45,46.
121. See Sanford J. Fox, The Juvenile Court. Its Context, Problems and Opportunities, in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 11(1967)
(describing the purpose of the founders of the Juvenile Court as promoting the welfare of
delinquents); RYERSON, supra note 25, at 35-56 (describing how the theory of rehabilitation was
implemented in the procedures of the court); Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of
Legislative Approaches to the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 19731995, 23 AM. J. CRM. L. 563, 566-67 (1996).
122. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
123. The most important reform initiative in the 1970s and 1980s was the Juvenile Justice
Standards Project, sponsored by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar
Association. The Standards Relating to Dispositions were of greatest importance for my purposes.
See IJA-ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 1-4 (1980)

[hereinafter IJA-ABA]. Also important was a task force on sentencing policy, sponsored by the 20th
Century Fund. See generally Report of the Twentieth Century Fumd Task Force on Sentencing
Policy Toward Young Offenders, in CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 1, 3 (1978) [hereinafter Report of
the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force].
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youth crime.2 4 The goal of this contemporary reform movement has
been to protect society from young offenders by subjecting juveniles
who commit serious crimes to the same standard of punishment as their
adult counterparts.
Embedded in the reform rhetoric of different periods are strikingly
different images of young offenders, and distinctive stories about their
typical characteristics. These accounts, in turn, have been employed to
shape and justify juvenile justice policy. The Progressive reformers in
the early years of the juvenile court described young offenders as
innocent vulnerable children to be molded into productive adults through
rehabilitative interventions. The post-Gault reformers of the 1970s and
1980s offered a more realistic view. Young offenders were less culpable
than adults because they lacked developmental experience and mature
judgment, but they were not blameless children. In contrast, the
descriptions by the reformers of the 1990s suggest that adolescent
offenders are indistinguishable from adult criminals.'"
Situating these accounts of childhood into the earlier discussion, the
Progressive reformers adopted the conventional approach of treating
delinquent youths as legal children and ascribing to them the traits of
innocence and vulnerability. The modem conservative reformers, on this
view, advocate shifting the boundary of childhood downward, and
defining young offenders as adults. As we have seen, these moves are
not unusual among policy makers-although, the contemporary
advocates of more punitive policies display a singular lack of concern
for youth welfare, and would count youngsters as adults at an age when
they are deemed children for virtually every other legal purpose.
For reasons that I will explore shortly, however, neither of these
approaches works well as a basis for policy towards adolescent
offenders. The standard binary categories fail as public policy in this
context because they undermine society's interest in public protection
and accountability (a flaw of the traditional court), or because they harm
124. "The juvenile violent crime arrest rate ... increased 64% batween 1988 and 1994...."
Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymansd, State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile Crime. 1996-97
Update, Juv. JUST. BuL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention). Nov. 1993. at 1,
2. "Mhe number of juveniles arrested for murder more than doubled between the mid-1980's and
Id.
I... According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations, more juveniles were
the peak in 1993 .
arrested for violent crime in 1991 and 1992 than in any other two-year.period in United States
history. See Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 121, at 564 (stating that juvenile homicide increased

171% from 1985 to 1992). Since the mid-1990s, the juvenile crime rate (including the homicide
rate) has actually declined. See Torbet & Szymansld, supra, at 2.
125. See YoUTH ON TRIAL: A DIEVELOPpENTAL PERSPCTPIE ON JuveN.iE JUSTICE 1-2

(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
126. See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
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young offenders and diminish their prospects for productive adulthood
(the deficiencies of contemporary policies). Indeed, I will argue that,
although the Progressive reformers focused on youth welfare and
modem conservatives emphasize public protection, both models are
seriously flawed even in terms of their self-defined goals. Only policies
that attend to adolescence as a distinctive developmental stage between
childhood and adulthood are likely to realize both of these objectives.
Only the post-Gault reformers understood this.
A.

The Early Juvenile Court: Young Offenders as
Innocent Children

The Progressive reformers at the turn of the century had an
ambitious agenda for improving the lives of children and promoting
their development into productive adults. Juvenile justice reform was
only one part of a far-reaching initiative that included compulsory school
attendance laws, restrictions on child labor, and the creation of a child
welfare system." In an era in which mid-adolescents often assumed
adult roles and burdens, an important objective of the reform was to
expand the boundaries of childhood, and to promote the idea that older
youths, like younger children, should enjoy the protection and solicitude
of the state. Miriam Van Waters described the underlying theory of the
juvenile court in the following terms:
[T]he child of [the] proper age to be under [the] jurisdiction of the
juvenile court is encircled by the arm of the state, which, as a
sheltering, wise parent, assumes guardianship and has power to shield
the child from the rigours of common law and from [the] neglect or
depravity of adults.'2
Several strategies were employed to accomplish this goal. First, as the
statement by Van Waters suggests, reformers employed romantic
rhetoric-describing the youthful subjects of reform policies in childlike
terms, drawing upon a shared understanding of the innocence,
vulnerability, and dependency of childhood. Images of children working
127. The "Century of the Child" began around 1890 with a broad agenda of institutional and
legal reform and social programs providing services aimed at children. For a discussion of
Progressive era reforms directed at children, see generally JOSEPH F. KTrr, RiTmS OF PASSAGE:
ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT 221-27 (1977); MURRAY LEVINE & ADELINE
LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING SERVICES: CLINIC, COURT, SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY 23
(1970); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST?: CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 14-33 (1982).
128. MIRIAM VAN WATERS, YOUTH IN CONFLICT 3 (1926). Van Waters was a prominent

juvenile court reformer.

20001

LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OFADOLESCEN'CE

in factories under horrendous conditions were evoked to generate

support for child labor and school attendance laws, under which youths
remained in school until age sixteen in many jurisdictions.' : Reinforcing

this image of youthfulness was the metaphor of the state as the kind
parent concerned only with the welfare of children.
The challenge of reshaping the image of young criminals was
particularly daunting. At the dawn of the juvenile court movement, only

young children were insulated from criminal prosecution on grounds of
infancy.' 0 A primary focus of the energies by the Progressive reformers
was the establishment of a separate court for the adjudication and

correction of offenders up to sixteen or eighteen years of age, a court
that would also respond to the needs of children who were subject to

abuse and neglect by their parents.'3 ' Central to the philosophy of the
new juvenile court (and to the political strategy of reformers) was the
claim that delinquent youths and children who were neglected by their
parents were not very different from each other. All of the children who
came within the jurisdiction of the court were innocent victims of
inadequate parental care, and the state's role in both delinquency and
neglect cases was to intervene "in the spirit of a wise parent toward an
erring child."'3

2

Indeed, parental neglect was understood to be the

primary cause of delinquency."' The political objective was to promote
an image of young offenders as children whose parents had failed them,
rather than as criminals who threatened the community.
129. See generally 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AM.ERIcA: A DOCUM2ENrARY HISTORY 601719 (Robert L Bremner ed., 1971); 3 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN A.MsImcA: A DCMENrttARY
HISTORY 299-518 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1974).
130. Under the common law infancy defense, children under age seven %ver without criminal
capacity, and children over age fourteen were to be treated as adults. See Andrew Walkover, The
Infancy Defense in the New Jurenile Court, 31 UCLA L REV. 503, 510-11 (1984). Children
between ages seven and fourteen were presumed incapable of committing crims, yet this
presumption could be overcome by the state if it were able to prove that the child understood the
wrongfulness of his or her acts. See iL at 511. The presumption garnered less weight as the child
approached age fourteen. See id at 511 n.22.
131. See hi at 515-17; Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L RE%. 104, 106
(1909).
132. VAN WATERS, supra note 128, at 5; see Fox, supra note 121, at 11 (noting that the
juvenile court "expressed a purpose of extending to the delinquent child the same care and
protection that was available for the neglected one").
133. Even the revisionist historians who are suspicious of the benign intentions of the
Progressive reformers implicitly accept that they viewed parents as the source of the (delinquenyl)
problem. For example, Anthony Platt argues that the reformers sought to remove children from the
influence of their immigrant parents and to substitute guidance by (in their %iev) %Nholceome
American government officials. See ANTHONY N1. PLATr. THE CHILD SAE.RS: THE NVrENIoN OF
DEINQUENCY 139 (2d ed. 1977); see also RYERSON. supra note 25. at 126 (stating that the
Reformers believed that delinquency is caused by faulty adult supervision .
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The reformers pursued this goal by emphasizing the similarity
between young delinquents and neglected children, and by advocating
similar treatment. Judge Mack's famous challenge is representative:
"Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we
deal with the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles
his own child whose errors are not discovered by the authorities?""'
Other juvenile court evangelists, such as Judge Ben Lindsay, offered
heartwarming stories of wayward children who came before the court,
and were set on the right path through the guidance of the fatherly judge
(himself) and other court personnel. 3 ' These romanticized accounts of
young delinquents included older youths as well as young boys and
girls, and serious crimes as well as minor misdeeds.3 6 All of the young
miscreants were described sympathetically as innocent children gone
astray who needed only the firm (but kind) parenting that the court could
provide.
Although the Progressive reformers effectively expanded the
boundaries of childhood through child labor and school attendance
reforms, their efforts in the juvenile justice context were less successful.
The romanticized descriptions of adolescent offenders as innocent
children played an important role in reinforcing the idealistic premise
that no conflict of interest pitted the state against the young offender,
and that the purpose of state intervention in delinquency cases (as in
child welfare cases) was solely to promote the welfare of the youngster
before the court. This was always a shaky premise that ignored the fact
that young offenders, unlike children whose parents provide inadequate
care, cause social harm through their criminal conduct. On reflection, it
seems clear that the failure to recognize adequately the state's inherent
interest in protecting society in delinquency cases constituted a corrosive
flaw at the heart of the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice.
Acceptance of rehabilitation likely was always predicated on its
effectiveness in reducing youth crime and protecting society.' 7

134. Mack, supra note 131, at 107.
135. See LINDSEY & O'HIGGINS, supra note 28, at 135-39; see also LEVINE & LEVINE, supra
note 127, at 203-23 (stating that Judge Lindsey used to take his delinquents to shows, out for meals,
and even visited their homes).
136. See LINDSAY & O'HIGGINS, supra note 28, at 170-77; VAN WATERS, supranote 128, at 3.
137. Justice Fortas, in his majority opinion for In re Gault, stated: "The child was to be
'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). However, he noted
that "the high crime rates among juveniles ...could not lead us to conclude that ... the juvenile
system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has largely done, is effective to reduce
crime or rehabilitate offenders." Id at 22 (citation omitted).
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Moreover, the non-adversarial procedures, indeterminate sentences, and
rejection of the criminal law principle of proportionality that were the
hallmarks of the traditional juvenile justice system were justified on
parens patriae grounds;"- ultimately, it became clear that they harmed
the interests of young offenders.'39 In short, the traditional model of
juvenile justice failed to promote the welfare of the young charges of the
system, and it failed to serve the larger societal interest. As the twentieth
century progressed, the myth of the rehabilitative ideal was discredited,
together with the image of the adolescent offender as an innocent child.
B. Young Offenders as Adults: Contemporary
Justice Refonn
In contrast to the Progressives, who described young offenders as
innocent children, conservative reformers today describe them as adults
who should be held fully accountable for their crimes.'4' Responding
initially to an increase in violent juvenile crime (particularly homicide),
reformers in the past decade have argued for policies under which
juveniles (at least those who commit serious crimes) are tried in adult
courts and sentenced to adult prisons. 4 ' The goals of modem criminal
justice reform are public protection and punishment, and in service of
these goals, reform rhetoric has obliterated any distinctions between
youthful offenders and adults. As one early supporter of "get tough"
policies argued, "there is no reason ...[to] be more lenient with a 16year-old first offender than a 30-year-old first offender."M
These advocates for tougher juvenile crime policies reject virtually
every aspect of the Progressive image of young offenders as immature
children. On their view, the romanticized accounts of youngsters getting
into scrapes with the law have no relevance in a world in which savvy
young offenders commit serious crimes. These reformers apparently
assume that there are no psychological differences between adolescent
138.

See NV.VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELuAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOiH: A STUDY
JUVENILE COURTS 15-21 (1972).

OFTHE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERIcAN

139. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how juvenile court
procedures and dispositional structure were grounded in the rehabilitative model. see RwErsO ;.
supra note 25, at 35-56; STAPLETON & TErrELBAUM, supra note 138, at 15-21 (describing how the

theory of rehabilitation was reflected in the procedural scheme of the court). For a scathing critique
of the procedural structure of the juvenile court, see FRANCis A. A..EN, THE BoaRILW;D OF

CRMINAL JusncE: ESSAYS iNLAW AND CRINtwOLOGY (1964).
140. See FkANKuNE. ZImR'G, AmBucAN YOUTH VIOLENcE 8 (1998).
141. In the second half of the 1990s, violent juvenile crime actually declined, but this has not
yet affected the enthusiasm for stricter policies. See Torbet & Szymanski. supranote 124 at 1.
142. Regnery, supranote 29, at 68.
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and adult offenders that are important to criminal responsibility."'
Juvenile offenders "are criminals who happen to be young, not children
who happen to commit crimes."'" This stance is partly (perhaps largely)
strategic. Images of childhood are associated with legal protection and
leniency; thus, policies that punish juveniles as adults are politically
more palatable if adolescent offenders are described as criminals, rather
than as children.
The modem reformers have pursued their agenda of shifting the
boundary of childhood downward through several legislative strategies.
The age of judicial transfer has been lowered in many states and a
broader range of felonies can trigger a transfer hearing.'"" In a transfer
hearing, an individualized determination is made on whether the young
defendant should be deemed a legal adult for purposes of criminal
prosecution or adjudicated as a child in juvenile court.'46 In contrast to
the standard applied under traditional juvenile court statutes, the inquiry
that determines this classification today is not made on the basis of
amenability to treatment (which is, in part, a maturity inquiry), but rather
on the seriousness of the offense and criminal record.'47 Under legislative
waiver statutes, young offenders charged with designated serious crimes
143. Elsewhere, Thomas Grisso and I have called this the "competence assumption." Elizabeth
S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile
Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 139 (1997); see also Janet E. Ainsworth,
Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV.
927, 948-49 (1995) (arguing that little distinction exists between adult and adolescent offenders),
Eric K Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal
Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIMa.L. REV. 371, 406 (1998) (arguing that people are not
referring to violent or chronic juvenile offenders when they speak of a "child").
144. Regnery, supranote 29, at 65.
145. Between 1992 and 1995, eleven states lowered the age for transfer, twenty-four states
added crimes to automatic/legislative waiver statutes, and ten states added crimes to judicial waiver
statutes. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 6 (1996). For example, North Carolina added all Class A
felonies to its list of crimes which trigger transfer hearings, and Missouri lowered its minimum
transfer age from fourteen to twelve for all felonies. See id.
146. See id. at 25.
147. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (,Vest 2000). In an allegation of involvement in a
murder, a minor who has committed two or more felonies while over age fourteen shall be
presumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, See id
Under traditional transfer statutes, the inquiry on the youth's amenability to treatment focused on
how the youth was likely to respond to rehabilitative interventions. See Matthew Thomas Wagman,
Note, Innocence Lost in the Wake of Green: The Trend Is Clear-IfYou Are Old Enough to Do the
Crime, Then You Are Old Enough to Do the Time, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 643, 643 (2000). Thus, past
treatment efforts, malleability, and general immaturity were important considerations. See id. at 643
n.2. Modem statutes are less concerned about whether the defendant is immature. Some statutes
require that the court determine whether the youth is competent to stand trial in adult court, a
constitutional due process requirement. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Michie 1999).
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are defined categorically as adults, and excluded from juvenile court
jurisdiction based on age and offense, without an inquiry into maturity.'""

Under "direct file" statutes, prosecutors determine the classification;
they can bring charges in either adult or juvenile court for a range of
serious offenses.' 9 Finally, blended sentencing statutes subject juveniles
to stiff minimum sentences in juvenile court, which are completed
through transfers to prison when the offender becomes an adult.' a The

upshot is that the mantra of punitive reformers, "'adult time for adult
crime,"' is a reality for many juveniles. Through a variety of policy
initiatives, the boundary of childhood has shifted dramatically and many

offenders who are not yet in high school are tried and sentenced as
adults.

Modem reformers advocate treatment of juvenile offenders as
adults primarily in pursuit of the utilitarian goal of public protection, and

assume that strict policies will enhance social welfare.'' In this regard,
the justice reforms bear some similarity to other laws that shift the

boundary of childhood to define adolescents as adults. The medical
consent statutes and federal restrictions on alcohol sales discussed
previously also aim to reduce the social cost of harmful behaviors by

minors. An obvious difference, of course, is that contemporary juvenile
justice reformers make no serious claim that young offenders themselves

will benefit. On this ground, the initiative to shrink the category of legal
childhood in the criminal justice context is unique, and seemingly
inconsistent with the values and policies that generally shape legal
148. Legislative waiver, also called "statutory exclusion," refers to the statutory schzm:
wherein juveniles above a certain age who commit certain crimes are automatically charged and
tried in adult court. See TORBEr Er AL, supra note 145, at 4. For cxample, in California, juveniles
age fourteen and up are automatically tried in adult court for the crimes of murder, rape, and a
number of other sexual offenses, including lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of
fourteen. See CAL- WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b), (e).
149. See TORBET Er AL, supra note 145, at 4; see also NEB. REV. STAT. AiN. § 43-276
(Michie Supp. 2000) (providing that the county attorney has the discretion, with certain
considerations, to file a juvenile petition, a mediation referral, or a criminal charge for juenilas
under age sixteen who have committed a felony).
150. Blended sentencing models vary primarily on the basis of %ihetheroriginal jurisdiction is
vested in the juvenile court or criminal court. See ToRBET Er AL. supra note 145, at 11-14. 'The
juvenile jurisdiction models include "juvenile-inclusive" where the offender would receive both a
juvenile and an adult sentence, and "juvenile-contiguous" w here the offender receives a szntence
from the juvenile court, which extends past the age of juvenile jurisdiction. See id. at 13. The
criminal court methods mimic the juvenile court types and include "criminal-inclusiv e" (,both). See
1i For the inclusive methods, the criminal sentence is usually suspended unless there is a violation
of parole, and in the contiguous method, various procedures are used to determine if the renuinder
of the sentence will be carried out once the offender becomes an adult.See iii
151. Elsewhere I call this "the 'utilitarian assumption."' Scott & Grisso, surpra note 143, at
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regulation of children. Holding immature offenders to adult standards of
criminal responsibility also challenges important principles that define

the boundaries of criminal punishment.5 2 Under these circumstances, it
is fair, at a minimum, to require substantial evidence that the reforms
will produce the promised social benefits. In fact, as I argue shortly,
even if the only goal of juvenile justice policy were to minimize the
social cost of youth crime, responses that treat young offenders like adult

criminals are unlikely to achieve that goal. Both social welfare and youth
welfare are undermined by these policies.
C. The Post-GaultReformers: Justice Policiesin a
DevelopmentalFramework
In re Gault"s3 exposed the flawed foundations of the rehabilitative
model of juvenile justice and shattered the myth that delinquency

interventions were aimed at promoting the welfare of wayward but
innocent children. As Justice Fortas pointed out, many juveniles got
"'the worst of both worlds."" Because of the Court's ostensibly benign
purposes, they were not accorded the procedural protections that adult
criminal defendants received. At the same time, many young offenders

were sent to correctional institutions for long sentences where they
received little rehabilitation.'
In the 1970s and 1980s, several reform groups responded to the
challenge of Gault by proposing juvenile justice policies based on a
realistic account of adolescence. 56 These initiatives rejected the image of

young offenders as innocent children that was so central to the
Progressive account and to traditional policies.' However, the postGault reformers were mindful of criminal law principles limiting
152. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
153. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. Id. at 18 n.23 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
155. Justice Fortas' statement should not be taken to mean that most juveniles were punished
as harshly as adult criminals. Although the traditional court ultimately failed even in terms of its
own objectives, juvenile court dispositions, in general, were not as punitive as were those given
adult offenders. See id. at 29.
156. The most sweeping reform project was the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, created by
the American Bar Association and the Institute for Judicial Administration. See UA-ABA, supra
note 123. Also important was a task force on juvenile sentencing sponsored by the Twentieth
Century Fund. See generally Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 123.
Franklin Zimring was the reporter on the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, and author of the
report of the project. See id. His monograph, Confronting Youth Crime, is the most thoughtful and
coherent statement of the perspective of the post-Gaultreformers.
157. See Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supra note 123, at 6-8; IJA-ABA,
supra note 123, at 5-13.
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punishment, and motivated to devise a system that served the interests of
young offenders as well as that of society. Thus, they rejected the
alternative of classifying adolescents as fully responsible adults. Young
offenders, under their account, possessed sufficient capacity for
understanding, reasoning, and moral judgment to be held accountable for
their offenses (and indeed needed lessons in accountability), but were
psychologically less mature and therefore less blameworthy than adult
offenders.' Moreover, as Franklin Zimring, the most prominent of the
reformers, argued, if delinquent youths were given "room to reform,"
predictably many would mature out of their tendencies to get involved in
crime. 5 9
The law reform groups struggled with the challenge of creating a
modem juvenile justice system that recognized that public safety and
retribution were legitimate policy goals, but that also acknowledged the
differences between adult and juvenile offenders."W Under this new
justice model, juvenile dispositions were to be based on the seriousness
6 ' However,
of the offense, rather than on the needs of the offender!"
because juveniles were less blameworthy than their adult counterparts,
their dispositions were to be categorically of shorter duration."
Furthermore, separate dispositional programs for juveniles were justified
to prepare them for adult roles and to insulate them from association
with adult criminals.' In short, the post-Gault reformers adopted a
model of juvenile justice policy that was grounded in the realities of
adolescent development and rejected conventional binary classification
of young offenders as either children or adults.
These reform efforts influenced legislative change. Many states
enacted statutes that explicitly rejected the traditional notion that
rehabilitation is the only purpose of juvenile justice intervention, and
recognized the importance of retribution and public protection'~
Modem statutory sentencing provisions focus on the seriousness of the
158. See Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force, supranote 123, at 6-7.
159. See id. at 7.

160. See IJA-ABA, supra note 123, at 5 (indicating that the purpose of Standard 1.1 is to
reduce crime by developing individual responsibility while recognizing unique characteristics of
juveniles).
161. Seeidaat6.
162. See id.
(stating that under Standards 1.2E & 2.1, range of punishment should be based on
offense, while actual punishment should be age appropriate).
163. See id. at 15-20.

164. Many states revised theirjuvenile codes to include new statements of purpoe. SeeTorbl t
& Szymansli, supranote 124, at 4; see also WASH. REv. CODE ANNtN.
§ 13.06.010 (West 1993) ("It

is the intention of the legislature in enacting this chapter to increase the protection afforded the
citizens of this state......
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offense and the prior record of the offender as key considerations.
Nevertheless, until recently, most statutory reforms also embodied the
core premise of the post-Gault initiatives-that because of their
developmental immaturity, most juveniles should be subject to a
juvenile court proceeding (though one that was characterized by

procedural formality and due process protections), and to more lenient
punishment than adults in separate correctional facilities."6'

Despite the recent trend toward classifying young offenders as
adults, the lessons of the post-Gault developmental model have

persisted.

Some

states

have

undertaken

legislative

reforms

accommodating the interests of the young offender and of society. For

example, Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act' 66 adopts a "balanced approach,"
embracing three goals: community protection, accountability, and

"competency development" (to enable young offenders to become
167

productive community members when they return to society).

Moreover, some courts insist on considering the immaturity of offenders

in sentencing young criminals, despite statutory encouragement to
impose "'adult time for adult crime."' Thus, a Michigan judge recently
insisted on sentencing a thirteen-year-old boy convicted of committing

homicide when he was eleven to a juvenile facility, despite a statutory
provision authorizing adult penalties.' ts Finally, new reform groups are
at work, promoting juvenile justice policies that acknowledge the
realities of adolescent development.' 6 In the next Section, I will argue

that this model is likely to be a more effective long-term strategy to
respond to juvenile crime than either the traditional approach or
contemporary policies.
165. See Jennifer A. Zepeda, Comment, Sentencing Juveniles for Murder in France and the
United States: Are They Juveniles Who Commit Adult Crimes or Adult Criminals Who Are
Juveniles?, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 289, 296-97 (1999).
166. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301 (West 1999).
167. See id. § 6301(b)(2) (stating that the purpose of the Juvenile Act is, "to provide for
children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation which provide
balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses
committed and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and
productive members of the community").
168. See Louise Knott & Oralandar Brand-Williams, Young Killer Gets Juvenile Detention:
State's Get-Tough Policy Blastedby Sentencing Judge, DsTROtT NEWS, Jan. 14, 2000, at Al.
169. The John D. & Catharine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice combines an ambitious research agenda with initiatives to inform
policy makers about developmental knowledge. See generally YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 26. The
Network has sponsored a volume by researchers on adolescent adjudicative competence and
culpability. See id. For further information on this study, see the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation Homepage, at http://www.macfound.orglindex.htm (last modified Feb. 16,
2001).
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D. The Casefor a Developmental Approach to
Juvenile Justice Policy
Although the boundary of childhood is drawn in most legal
contexts without reference to the transitional developmental stage of
adolescence, an approach that categorically defines adolescents charged
with crimes as either children or adults has costly consequences. Both
the Progressives who established the traditional juvenile court and
modem punitive reformers are committed to fictional accounts about the
clientele of the juvenile justice system, because these accounts are
essential to their policy agendas. This stratagem, although it is standard
among policy makers, fails in this context, and policies based on the
conventional binary categories fail either to promote youth welfare or to
serve the public interest. These objectives will be better served I will
argue if policy makers recognize that young offenders are neither
innocent children nor mature adults.""
Despite its benign tone, the myth constructed by the architects of
the traditional juvenile court ultimately did more harm than good. Even
assuming that the Progressive reformers had pure intentions (an
assumption that some have challenged),"' the myth was probably never
persuasive when applied to older youths charged with serious crimes. It
led many to conclude that the juvenile justice system was insufficiently
concerned about public safety and accountability." Moreover, those
who cared about the interests of young offenders recognized that the
fictional premise of the traditional model obscured the extent to which
punishment and public protection were important but hidden forces that
determined the disposition of young offenders."3 Because its avowed
goal was to promote the welfare of young delinquents, the juvenile court
operated without the procedural constraints that protect adult criminal
defendants, whose interest was always understood to be in conflict with
that of the state. Further, again, because the ostensible purpose of
intervention was to rehabilitate rather than punish the child, the court
and correctional system had virtually unbridled discretion in fashioning
dispositions, unconstrained by the principles limiting criminal
170. The analysis in this Section draws on Scott, supra note 26.
171. See PLATr, supra note 133, at 4. Platt argued that anti.immigrant sentiment vas an
important motivation of Progressive reforms, and that an important goal of state intervention was to

combat the "foreign" influence of immigrant parents on their children. See id. at 25-26.
172. The focus of criticism was the ineffectiveness of rehabilitation, as evidenced by juvenile

recidivism rates. See FELD, supra note 10, at 92-94. Many critics assumed that tough:r pnalties
would more effectively deter crime. See itL at 94.
173. See id. at 72.
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punishment. 74 Thus, as Justice Fortas noted, juveniles, indeed,
sometimes got the worst of both worlds-no procedural protections and
little rehabilitation in prison-like correctional facilities.'75
In contrast, modem reformers who would "get tough" on juveniles
make no pretense that they aim to benefit young offenders, an objective
that is made irrelevant by their assumption that adolescents deserve the
same punishment for their offenses as their adult counterparts. They also
assume (and argue) that shifting the boundaries of childhood is essential
to protect society from the ravages of juvenile crime. The empirical
evidence from developmental psychology and criminology challenges
both of these assumptions. First, it supports the argument that holding
young offenders fully accountable for their crimes violates the principle
of proportionality, which defines fair criminal punishment. The
constraints of proportionality are satisfied if juvenile offenders are held
to a standard of diminished criminal responsibility, because their
decisions about involvement in criminal activity reflect immaturity of
understanding and judgment. Second, the assumption that strict penal
policies promote social welfare is challenged by evidence about the role
of antisocial behavior in adolescent development. This evidence
suggests that many adolescents are inclined to engage in criminal
activity and desist with maturity. Thus, policy makers who are focused
on utilitarian goals must calculate not only the direct costs of the harm
caused by young offenders, but also the long term costs of criminal
punishment.
1. Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence
The criminal law assumes that most offenders make rational
autonomous choices to commit crimes, and that the legitimacy of
punishment is undermined if the decision is coerced, irrational, or based
on a lack of understanding about the meaning of the choice.'76 The
174. Francis Allen wrote a scathing criticism of the juvenile court before Gault, challenging
the fairness of the lax procedures, as well as the premise of rehabilitation. See generally ALLEN,
supra note 139; see also Sheldon Glueck, Some "Unfinished Business" in the Management of
Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 628, 629 (1964) ("[E]ven a juvenile court can,.,
overstep the bounds of fairness .... ); Orman W. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile
Court, 7 CRIME & DELINQ. 97, 101 (1961) ("The state has no right to substitute governmental for
parental neglect.") (emphasis omitted); Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairnessto the Juvenile Offender, 41
MINN. L. REV. 547, 550 (1957) ("We cannot take away precious legal protection simply by
changing names from 'criminal prosecution' to 'delinquency proceedings."').
175. See supranotes 154-55 and accompanying text.
176. These mitigating factors are recognized in the criminal law defenses of duress, insanity,
and mistake of fact. See PETER W. Low ET At.., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL.S 246-57,
604-06, 752-54 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing mistake of fact, duress, and insanity, respectively).
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principle of proportionality requires that punishment be proportionate to
blameworthiness, which in turn is mitigated if the individual's decisionmaking capacity is deficient.'" Thus, a defendant whose decisionmaking is grossly distorted by mental illness may be fully excused from
responsibility under the insanity defense.
The relationship between immaturity and criminal responsibility
has been obscured for much of the twentieth century by the adjudication
and disposition of juveniles in a separate system that lacked a
vocabulary to analyze these issues. Historically (prior to the founding of
the juvenile court), the presumption that immaturity was relevant to
assessing blame was captured in the common law infancy defense."
However, punishment, responsibility, and blameworthiness had no place
in the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice, and thus, the issue of how
the criminal law should take immaturity into account in assigning
punishment received little attention for decades. Recently, as policy
makers seek to punish children as adults, this issue has become salient
once again. Yet, a doctrinal, analytic, and scientific vacuum of sorts
exists, and there is much empirical and conceptual work to be done to
provide a sound basis for policy.
The psychological research evidence suggests that developmental
factors characteristic of adolescence contribute to immature judgment in
ways that seem likely to affect criminal choices.'" In general, youths are
likely to have less knowledge and experience to draw on in making
decisions than adultsY' Moreover, peer conformity is a powerful
influence on adolescent behavior, and may lead teens to become
involved in criminal activity to avoid social rejection. t ' It is not
surprising that, in contrast to adult crime, most juvenile criminal activity
takes place in groups.' n Adolescents also seem to perceive risks
177. See id. at 7.
178. See supranote 130 and accompanying text.
179. See Scott, supra note 26, at 292. The research evidence is based on studies of
psychological development in several domains. See iL at 300-07.
180. Seeidat302.
181. Research supports that conformity and compliance are important influences in aolescent
behavior. See generally Thomas J. Bemdt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and
Parents, 15 DEVOLOPMENTAL PSYCHOL 608 (1979); Philip R. Costanzo & Marvin E. Shaw.

Conformity as a Function ofAge Level, 37 CtILD DEV. 967 (1966). There is also evidence that rzer
conformity plays an important role in youth crime. See generally Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & David P.
Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About Co-Offending: Results from a Prospective Longitudinal
Sun,ey of London Males, 82 J. Cani. L & CIUMtINoLOGY 360 (1991) (describing the importance of
peer influence on adolescent crime).

182. See Reiss & Farrington, supra note 181, at 360; see also Franklin E. Zimring, Kids,
Groups and Crime: Some Implicationsof a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRUIM.
L & CRMnI.',OLOGY
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differently or less well than adults, and they are more inclined to engage

in risky activities (smoking, drinking, unprotected sex, and delinquent
behavior, for example).

3

Finally, time perspective changes with

maturity. As compared to adults, adolescents tend to focus more on
immediate, rather than long term, consequences.1
It is not difficult to speculate about how these traits might

contribute to youthful decisions to get involved in criminal activityalthough it must be acknowledged that we have little direct research
evidence about decision-making "on the street." A youth, considering
the prospect of a convenience store holdup, might fail to perceive risks
that adults would recognize. In part, this may be due to a greater
tendency to discount the future and to focus on short-term consequences.
Peer approval, the excitement of the situation, and the possibility of

getting some money may all weigh more heavily in his or her decisionmaking than the possibility of apprehension or the long term

consequences for his or her future resulting from a criminal conviction. 8'
These developmental influences on adolescent decision-makingpeer influence, risk perception and preference, and time perspectivetogether contribute to immature judgment, which distinguishes

adolescent decision-making about involvement in crime from that of
adults. 6 This developmental immaturity constitutes evidence supporting
the argument that adolescents are less blameworthy in their criminal
choices than are adults. On the other hand, adolescents are not innocent
children. At least by mid-adolescence, the differences between
adolescents and adults are considerably more subtle than those that
867, 867 (1981) (discussing the frequently ignored fact that adolescents commit crimes in groups,
and the consequences of this ignorance when analyzing juvenile criminal activity).
183. See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 1-2 (1992) (describing decision-making about risky
behavior in a rational decision-making framework); William Gardner & Janna Herman,
Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS INTHE AIDS
EPIDEMIC 17, 17-34 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990); see also Thomas J. Cottle et al., Adolescent
Perceptions of Time: The Effect of Age, Sex, and Social Class, 37 J. PERSONALITY 636 (1969)
(discussing the effects of age, sex, and social class on adolescent perceptions of time); A.L. Greene,
Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 99 (1986) (discussing how a mixture of experimental, contextual, and self-referent
factors influence the future that adolescents envision).
184. See Scott et al., supranote 36, at 231; see also Joseph P. Allen et al., The Relationship of
Adolescents' Expectations and Values to Delinquency, Hard Drug Use, and Unprotected Sexual
Intercourse, 2 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 85 (1990); Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See
Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 1-3, 47-48 (1991); Steinberg & Cauffman, supranote 36, at 408-09.
185. See Scott, supranote 26, at 303-05.
186. See Scott et al., supra note 36, at 227.
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distinguish from the norm-the defendant who is excused from
responsibility by reason of insanity.' g Thus, adolescent immaturity

should not excuse young offenders from criminal responsibility, but
rather should support a standard of diminished responsibility." 3 A

diminished responsibility standard recognizes that most young offenders
are in a transitional
developmental stage and calibrates criminal liability
59

accordingly

Under such a regime, young offenders can be held
accountable for the bad choices they make, without bearing the full costs
of their mistakes. 9
2. Adolescent Development and the Social Costs of
Juvenile Crime
It is unlikely that many people who support punishing young

offenders as adults will be persuaded by arguments that juveniles should
be subject to a standard of diminished responsibility. The likely response
is that the differences between adults and adolescents are modest and

should be ignored, because the top priority of justice policy must be to
respond to the powerful threat to social welfare posed by juvenile crime.

In this Section, I challenge the claim that punitive policies are the
optimal means to achieve public protection and to minimize the social

cost of youth crime, and suggests that utilitarian ends can better be
served by policies that protect the future prospects of young offenders.

The argument for discounting youth as a mitigating factor in
applying criminal sanctions has a superficial appeal. After all, youths
who are in prison cannot be on the street committing crimes. However,

the utilitarian assumption ignores the long-term costs of punitive
policies, costs that are likely to be substantial given the developmental

patterns of antisocial behavior in adolescence. Criminal behavior is rare
187. The insanity defense is available only to severely disordered offenders. Only a small
percentage of defendants successfully assert the insanity defense. See. e.g.. Ira Miekenberg. A
PleasantSurprise: The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded in Its Own Right and
Successfully Preservedthe TraditionalRole of the Insanity Defense,55 U. Cw. L REV. 943. 967-70
(1987) (reviewing research showing that the insanity defense is rarely used and rarely suec;sful);
see also Michael L. Criss & D. Robert Racine, Impact of Change in Legal Standardfor Those
Adjudicated Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 1975-1979, 8 BULL AM. MAD. PSY cuLtRY & L
261, 264-66 (1980) (illustrating through statistical data that the use and success of the insanity
defense is rare).
188. Franklin E. Zimring makes a similar argument in AimFRmcmN, Yotrmi VIOItXwCE 75-81
(1998), and The Hardestof the Hard Cases: Adolescent Homicide in Juvenileand Criminal Co:trts,
6 VA. J. Soc. PoL'y & L. 437,447-48 (1999).
189. Barry Feld has made a similar argument. See FELD, supra note 10. at 317.
190. Franklin Zimring describes adolescence as a probationary pr.rid, in %%hich ioung
offenders learn lessons in accountability. See ZIMRNGc, supra note 8. at 89-96.
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in early adolescence; it increases through age sixteen, and decreases
sharply from age seventeen onward. 9' Most teenage males participate in
some delinquent behavior, a fact that has led Terrie Moffitt, a

developmental criminologist, to conclude that delinquent behavior is "a
normal part of teen life."' 92 However, most youthful criminal conduct is
what Moffitt has called "adolescence-limited" behavior. The typical
adolescent offender predictably will desist from criminal activity and
mature into a productive (or at least not criminal) citizen if he survives

this stage without destroying his or her life chances.' 93 Contrary to the
assumption of advocates for tougher sanctions, only a small minority are

"life-course-persistent" offenders (in Moffitt's parlance)-youths who
are at high risk for lives as career criminals." 9 Whether and when
individuals in the first group will assume conventional adult roles is
likely to depend in part on the state's response to their youthful criminal
conduct. A policy of categorically imposing adult criminal penalties on

young offenders may increase the probability that they will become
career criminals, or it may delay desistence.' 9 At a minimum, it seems a
191. See generallyDavid P. Farrington, Offendingfrom 10 to 25 Years ofAge, in PRosPEcrlVIi
STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 17 (Katherine Teilmann Van Dusen & Sarnoff A. Mednick

eds., 1983).
192. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-PersistentAntisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993).

193. See id. Several other researchers have documented the tendency of antisocial and criminal
behavior to increase in adolescence and then decline sharply after adolescent years. See, e.g.,
RICHARD JESSOR

& SHIRLEY L. JESSOR, PROBLEM BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:

A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF YOUTH (1977); Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing
Criminal Careers,237 So. 985, 991 (1987); David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, in 7 CRIME AND

JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 189, 236 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris cds.,
1986); Farrington, supra note 191, at 17; Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the
Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552, 557 (1983); Edward P. Mulvey & John F. LaRosa, Jr.,
Delinquency

Cessation and Adolescent

Development: Preliminary Data, 56

AM.

J.

ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 212, 214, 222 (1986).
194. Under Moffitt's taxonomy, these two groups differ in ways that may be important to
desistence. See generally Moffitt, supra note 192. Life-course-persistent offenders tend to have
problems in many domains beginning in early childhood, and their offending begins at a younger
age. See id. In contrast, adolescent-limited offenders have little history of problem behavior in
childhood. See id. Thus, adolescents for whom delinquency is limited to this developmental stage
will not bear the cumulative effects of lifelong antisocial conduct. See Moffit, supra note 192, at
691. Typically, their delinquent activity is also of a less serious nature. See id. They are also more
likely to have acquired social and academic skills that prepare them for adult roles. See id. Finally,
their delinquency does not reflect deeply entrenched personality disorders as may often be true of
life-course-persistent offenders. See id. All of these factors may facilitate the transition to
conventional adult roles. See id. at 690-91.

195. Some recent research results support this claim. One study found that recidivism was
lower among New Jersey youths adjudicated in Juvenile Court than among similar New York
offenders tried and punished as adults. See Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile
Versus Criminal CourtSanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW &
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modest claim that criminal punishment will undermine the future
educational and employment prospects and general social productivity of
those offenders whose criminal conduct is adolescence-limited.
Developmental analysis suggests that the policy reformers who
embrace utilitarian objectives have failed to include in their calculus
some important social costs of punitive policies.' 5 Predictions about the
effectiveness of these policies are based on one of two assumptionsperhaps on both. Either the reformers believe that most young offenders
are incipient career criminals (and thus, the social benefits of adult
punishment may outweigh the predicted costs to their future life
prospects), or they believe that the future course of young offenders'
lives will not be affected negatively by adult criminal punishment. The
psychological evidence indicates that the first assumption is simply
inaccurate; the second seems implausible.
What would the features of a juvenile justice policy be based on a
realistic account of adolescence? First, such a policy would incorporate
principles of accountability through the adoption of a diminished
responsibility standard. This is important for several reasons. Public
acceptance and moral legitimacy are crucially important to the success
of criminal justice policy.' 97 There is substantial evidence that American
society cares about youthful accountability, and would support policies
based on diminished responsibility, as long as public protection were not
sacrificed.' Moreover, lessons in accountability benefit young
offenders; adolescents need to learn from their foolish choices, so that
they can assume adult roles and responsibilities successfully" Second,
a developmentally-based juvenile justice policy would seek to protect,
rather than damage, adolescents' prospects for a productive future.
Procedural protections that limit the stigma and lasting impact of
delinquency status are worthwhile (for example, closed hearings and
POL'Y 77 (1996). The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice has recently undertaken a longitudinal study that
should provide important information on this issue.

196. See Scott, supra note 26, at 292-93.
197. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, L

rA1ILTY,
AND BL,t.t
Co.NmuNrrY Vimws AND mE CzIMNAL LAW 5-11 (1995) (describing empirical studies supporting
the argument that the criminal law conforms, at least roughly, to societal attitudes, and that this is
important to its legitimacy); Paul IL Robinson & John MUDailey, The Utilio,of Desert,91 Nw. U.

L. REV. 453,468-71 (1997) (same).
198. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 197, at 127. These researchers found that
respondents in their study favored more lenient punishment of immature minors, particularly if
young offenders were civilly committed. See ihL at 145-47. This suggests that a concern about
public safety mediates attitudes about youthful culpability.
199. See ZIRUNG, supra note 8, at 89-90.
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sealed records). 2 ° Dispositional programs that emphasize education and
job skills can better prepare young offenders for adult roles.
Finally, it seems important to maintain a separate system of
adjudication and disposition for juveniles, a system in which juveniles
are accorded procedural protections, but are subject to reduced penalties
and offered programs that promote their healthy development. Some
observers have argued that a unified criminal justice system that
provided a "youth-discount" in sentencing would better serve the
interests of both young offenders and society."0' Such an approach is
consistent with a diminished responsibility model, and would afford
young defendants the full range of procedural protections. My objections
to this proposal are largely practical. I am skeptical that the criminal

justice system has either the ability or inclination to respond to
adolescents as a separate legal category. Political pressure appears to
function as a one way ratchet, toward ever stiffer penalties. A separate
juvenile justice system is more likely to recognize the reduced
culpability of young offenders through more lenient sentencing, and to

invest in programs designed for adolescents."'

200. See Andrew R. Kintzinger, Comment, Freedom of the Press vs. Juvenile Anonymity: A
Conflict Betveen Constitutional Prioritiesand Rehabilitation, 65 IOWA L. REv. 1471, 1484-85
(1980); Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to Juvenile Justice: Should Freedom of
the Press Be Limited to Promote Rehabilitation of Youthfid Offenders?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1897,
1901-02 (1995).
201. Barry Feld argues that the juvenile and criminal courts should be reunified. See FELD,
supra note 10, at 289. He bases his position on what he terms the "built-in contradiction" of the
juvenile justice system: while the court claims to offer treatment, its jurisdiction is not based on a
need for treatment, but rather on the offense committed, thus "highlight[ing] the aspect of youths
that rationally elicits the least sympathy and ignor[ing] ... social conditions most likely to evoke a
desire to help." Il at 295. His plan for unification includes full procedural protections for young
offenders, and differential sentencing tied to the age of the offender. See id. at 297. For example, a
fourteen-year-old offender would receive twenty-five percent of the adult sentence, and a sixteenyear-old would receive fifty percent of the adult sentence. See id. at 317. The larger discount for the
younger offender corresponds "to the developmental continuum" of responsibility. See id. This
sentencing policy would be standardized and not discretionary, see id. at 304, and would be based
on the idea that "youthfulness constitutes a universal form of 'reduced responsibility' or 'diminished
capacity."' Id. at 317.
202. A separate juvenile court is also a better forum for accommodating the more limited trial
competence of young defendants, without sacrificing procedural protections. The Supreme Court in
In re Gault extended many procedural protections to juveniles, requiring the state to prove the guilt
of juvenile defendants through fair procedures. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967). These
protections benefit juveniles, but younger adolescents may be more limited in their capacity to make
decisions in the process or to assist their attorney. See generally Scott & Grisso, supra note 143.
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V. ADOLESCENCE iN THE DEFINITION OF CHILDHOOD

It could be said that adolescence and the juvenile court are of about
the same age. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the
publication of G. Stanley Hall's Adolescence' was this transitional
developmental stage between childhood and adulthood identified and
described.' Over the course of the twentieth century, legal policy
makers have tended to ignore adolescence, and to classify and describe
adolescents categorically as either children or as adults, depending on
the issue at hand. Through the creation of a series of bright line rules,
however, the process of becoming a legal adult is extended through
adolescence and into early adulthood, without establishing an
intermediate category for this group. This approach generally has
functioned effectively to promote both youth welfare and social welfare.
It has not worked well in juvenile justice policy. The experience of
the twentieth century reveals that justice policies that treat young
offenders either as children or as adults undermine both social welfare
and youth welfare. Both Progressive and conservative juvenile justice
models are flawed because they fail to attend to the unique importance,
in this context, of recognizing and reconciling the conflicting interests of
young offenders and society, without sacrificing either. The Progressives
failed to see the conflict, while modem conservatives fail to see the need
for reconciliation. A policy based on the developmental reality of
adolescence offers the promise of meeting this challenge successfully.
The twenty-first century may see policy makers paying attention to
the transitional stage of adolescence in other domains. Our experience
with abortion regulation tells us that this move can be costly, and should
be undertaken only when binary categories are inadequate. In some
contexts, living as an adult in society presents complex challenges, and
adolescents (and society) might benefit from a probationary period in
which adult skills can be acquired, with protection against the costs of
inexperienced choices.2-' For example, recent innovations in the
regulation of adolescent driving privileges allow young persons to gain

203. G. STANLEYHALL, ADoLE.scFNcE(194).
204. See KErr, supra note 127, at 216-21. Hall saw adolescence "as tom by dualisms v%,hich

disrupted the harmony of childhood; hyperactivity and inertia. social sensibility and self-absorption.
lofty intuitions and childish folly." Id at 217.
205. In the early 1980s, Franklin Zimring adopted the metaphor of the "learner's Plrmit."
describing adolescence as a period in which young persons learn lessons in freedom and
responsibility, in preparation for adulthood, without bearing the full cost of their mistakes. See
ZIMRNG, supranote 8 at 89-98. The developmental model of juvenile justice policy fits this mulel.
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experience while limiting risk.206 On issues as varied as liability on
contracts and preferences in custody disputes, courts and legislatures in
the late twentieth century have recognized, implicitly at least, that
adolescents are persons who are not yet adults, but are different from
young children.07
Adolescence itself has become increasingly complex in the modern
era. Young persons are more sophisticated and have more freedom than
ever before; at the same time, dependency extends further into
adulthood. Legal regulation of this category of citizens will never be
simple, although the themes that underlie much existing policy are likely
to continue to dominate. As a general matter, the long term interests of
adolescents converge with the interests of society. Policies that
recognize this convergence are likely to be effective.

206. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
207. A modem variation of the infancy defense adopted by some courts allows minors to
disaffirm contracts, but holds them accountable for damage, unless the other party engaged in
overreaching. See Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tenn. 1992). Adolescents' preferences
are given substantial weight in custody disputes, unless their choice of custodian is clearly against
their interest. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

